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Abstract
We empirically analyze the relationship between geopolitical risk and the U.S. stock
market, with the goal of determining if this risk is priced. The geopolitical risk
indexes created by Caldara and Iaoviello (2017) and the Fama and French (2015)
5-Factor asset pricing model form the basis of our study. We insert geopolitical
risk as an additional factor in the 5-Factor model to determine if geopolitical risk
maintains explanatory power when controlling for other proxies of risk. The 5-
factors take away most explanatory power from geopolitical risk in explaining time-
series returns. We highlight though the importance of separating the effect of the
level of geopolitical risk from shocks to geopolitical risk. Then, a Fama-MacBeth
(1973) two-pass regression is performed to determine if geopolitical risk is priced.
We find that the level of geopolitical risk related to actions is significantly priced
from 1988-2016.
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1 Introduction
Many risks that investors face in the stock market are systematic in nature, affecting
wide portions of the market.1 For example, natural disasters, politics, geopolitics, and
macroeconomic factors generally are of this nature. Practitioners, companies, and gov-
ernments recognize these risks as potentially impacting financial markets as evidenced by
their inclusion in economic outlooks, financial statements, and regulatory guidelines. 2
Recently, our lack of understanding regarding the effect of these risks on financial mar-
kets has started to come to light. Kelly, Pastor, and Veronesi (2016) recognized this with
regard to political uncertainty, citing “despite the salience of political uncertainty, our
understanding of its effects on the economy and financial markets is only beginning to
emerge.” Similarly, Chen, Ross, and Roll (1986) set out to identify economic factors that
systematically affect the stock market, writing that “a rather embarrassing gap exists
between the theoretically exclusive importance of systematic ”state variables” and our
complete ignorance of their identity.”
One potential “state variable” that hasn’t been well-studied is the geopolitical en-
vironment. A major reason there have not been systematic empirical analyses of the
impact of geopolitics on financial markets might be because there was not a common def-
inition and measure until very recently of the risks that stem from geopolitics. Caldara
and Iacoviello (2017) laid the groundwork for analysis of the impact of these geopolitical
risks on financial markets by creating a common definition of geopolitical risk as “risk
associated with wars, terrorist acts, and tensions between states that affect the normal
and peaceful course of international relations.” Based on this definition, Caldara et al.
created several different indexes that capture different forms of geopolitical risk. Briefly
stated, each index measures the level of geopolitical risk every month by counting the
amount selected key words related to geopolitical risk appear in major newspapers.
These indexes measure the level of existent risk every month, which contrasts with
shocks to geopolitical risk. Caldara et al. create a measure of shocks to geopolitical risk
by modeling the difference between expected and realized geopolitical risk levels via an
autoregressive process with a one time period lag. Shocks are measured as the difference
between the expected level of geopolitical risk and the realized level of geopolitical risk.
Though a simple model, evidence suggests this is fairly representative of how investors
actually create expectations of geopolitical risks.3 Since the creation of the geopolitical
risk indexes in 2017, no literature has set out to expand upon the initial analyses per-
1 Modern financial theory has focused on systematic influences as the source of investment risk. The
view is often maintained that risk related to individual securities can be diversified away.
2Fidelity, BlackRock, Bank of America, and ECB
3Case studies by Schneider and Troeger (2006) show that any developments in armed conflicts usually
come as a complete surprise to investors. Furthermore, literature on investor behavior indicates investors
have short memories with geopolitical events and frequently dismiss geopolitical events as possible until
they actually happen due to the extremely high stakes and costs involved.
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formed by Caldara et al. on the relationship between geopolitical risk and the U.S. stock
market. The driving goal of this study is to further empirical analysis by utilizing the
recent advent of the geopolitical risk indexes.
Our study proceeds as follows. First, we provide an overview of literature demon-
strating that geopolitical risk has been observed to impact the stock market. We proceed
to highlight literature to help conceptualize what is meant by “level” of geopolitical risk
versus “shocks” to geopolitical risk, along with how shocks to factors in general impact
the stock market. We then outline our motivation for separating geopolitical risk into
four measures: the level of geopolitical threats and the level of geopolitical actions; and
shocks to geopolitical threats and shocks to geopolitical actions. Literature highlights
the possibility that geopolitical actions actually work to reduce uncertainty since they
stave off worst-case scenarios in the mind of investors and make the realization of the
risk more predictable. Meanwhile, geopolitical threats tend to increase uncertainty over
future actions. As such, we think it’s important to distinguish between the two versions
of geopolitical risk in any analysis.
The first question we ask is, “What is Geopolitical Risk?”. Here, we focus on de-
termining if the measures of geopolitical risk are unique from other commonly accepted
proxies of risk. While Caldara et al. have demonstrated that there is a significant re-
lationship between shocks to geopolitical risk and market returns, their study begs the
question of if this risk is actually new and unique from other proxies of risk. To this end,
we study geopolitical risk in the context of the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor asset
pricing model. We examine the ability of each measure of geopolitical risk to explain
returns of various portfolios when controlling for the 5-factors. We find that the 5-factors
mostly take away explanatory power from measures of geopolitical risk in time-series re-
gressions, though some measures appear to be more unique than others. Furthermore,
we indeed observe that it is important to distinguish between effects geopolitical risk
associated with threats versus geopolitical risk associated with actions
Secondly, we ask “Is Geopolitical Risk Priced?”. We find in the first section the
measures of geopolitical risk are largely not unique from the 5-factors in explaining re-
turns. This does not necessarily mean that geopolitical risk cannot be priced. We use
a Fama-MacBeth two-pass regression to determine the “risk premium” on each measure
of geopolitical risk, which is equivalent to the price of risk. For example, if an asset is
1 unit more sensitive to geopolitical risk, the price of risk tells us how much an investor
can expect to be compensated for taking on that extra risk. In accordance with standard
practice in literature, we examine the price of each measure of geopolitical risk in 10 dif-
ferent time periods from 1988-2016, along with over the entire time period. The price of
geopolitical risk tells us how much investors can expect to be compensated for taking on
additional exposure to geopolitical risk. Again, by examining the pricing of each measure
of geopolitical risk alongside the Fama and French 5-factors, we can determine if this risk
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is uniquely priced from other factors. We find that the level of geopolitical action is the
only consistently priced measure of geopolitical risk.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Literature on Geopolitical Risk and the Stock Market
Several studies have determined that geopolitical events, such as war, have a real effect on
trade, national income, and the growth of economies in general.4 Naturally, a relationship
then between the real economy and the stock market is often assumed. But, showing the
relationship between geopolitical events, such as war, and financial markets is in actuality
more complicated. Depending on the specific case and the type of geopolitical risk,
the stock market has been observed to have a wide assortment of reactions. Schneider
and Troeger (2006) note “the indifference or even cheerfulness with which international
markets sometimes react to the escalation of armed conflicts.” They specifically point
to the Dow Jones gaining 17 points in the first four weeks of Operation Desert Storm
and the similar reaction following the commencement of the second Iraq war. Schneider
and Troeger examine the reaction of the stock market within three major case studies
of armed conflict, and based on these case studies, they determine that markets “do not
generally respond to the ups and downs of the three conflicts.”
Others have also studied the reaction of the stock market to specific geopolitical events,
often providing conflicting results. It seems that the sheer amount of unique factors to
any specific geopolitical occurrence makes it difficult to draw general conclusions. For
example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) demonstrate that the reactions of financial markets
to the Russo-Japanese war were quite limited. They posit that this was because the likely
winner of the war was clear from the outset; therefore investors could accurately assign
probabilities to the outcomes and were rarely faced with any major shocks. Meanwhile,
as Schneider and Troeger found, the Gulf War and second Iraq war saw significant move-
ments in the financial markets and even strong upward reactions as uncertainty dissipated
when it became clear who would win. Schneider and Troeger were able to make limited
general statements though that applied to all three of their case studies. Like Obstfeld
and Rogoff, their cases displayed a wide range of positive and negative reactions to events
with few clear patterns that ruled. 5 This is a common problem in the existing literature:
without a common measure of geopolitical risk, it is difficult, if not impossible, to con-
duct a systematic empirical analysis of the stock market’s reaction to the risks posed by
geopolitics. The existing literature has had to rely on case studies to examine the effect
4Bloomberg, Hess, and Orphanides (2004), Glick and Taylor (2010), Organski and Kugler (1977)
found that the costs of a war affect the economy for several decades.
5One pattern they did find though was it appeared that negative shocks were more impactful (i.e.
increasing of tensions) on returns than positive shocks (i.e. treaty talks).
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of geopolitical risk on the stock market.
Caldara and Iacoviello (2017) recognized this gap in our empirical understanding of the
effect of geopolitical risk on both the economy and financial markets. They posited that
the main reason systematic empirical analyses had not been performed was because an
index that measured geopolitical risk consistently over time and captured the perspectives
of the press, public, investors, and policy makers did not exist. Therefore, they created
a monthly Geopolitical Risk index (GPR) ranging from 1985 to present that attempts
to comparably measure the level of geopolitical risk for any given month. More specifics
of the construction of this index itself will be provided in section 4.1. There are several
varieties of this index that rely on counting the appearance of several key words in major
newspapers. Their geopolitical risk indexes have already been cited by many companies
and government institutions as an operable indicator of geopolitical risk, but there is
still a lack of systematic empirical analysis of the relationship between these indexes and
the stock market. Namely, the literature has not adequately addressed if geopolitical
risk is unique from known proxies of risk. Furthermore, it’s often assumed that only
shocks to geopolitical risk impact the stock market, with little regard for a possible level
effect. Lastly, the literature has not explored if geopolitical risk is priced, indicating that
investors can expect to be compensated for taking on additional exposure to the risk.
Along with creating the geopolitical risk indexes, Caldara and Iacoviello have begun
to show the application of their index in explaining movements in the stock market. They
examine the effect of shocks to the GPR index on returns across several countries market
indexes, along with its impact on world stock returns. A simple model is created where
the monthly returns of each countrys market index, rit is explained by the independent
variable GPRSHOCKt, which is the residual of an autoregressive process with one time
period lag estimated for the GPR index every month:
rit = ui + αwldGPRSHOCKt + wld,t (1)
Using equation 1, they determine that GPRSHOCK almost universally depresses mar-
ket returns across the countries examined, but the magnitude of this effect varies across
countries. In addition to this, they create a model that examines the relationship between
world-wide stock returns and the GPRSHOCK variable.
They find a statistically significant relationship between GPRSHOCK and world-wide
stock returns in the 1900-2016 period of measurement, with a more significant relationship
found in the 1985-2016 time period. This finding is confirmed by repeating the analysis
except with the residuals of the AR(1) processes for Geopolitical Threats (GPT) and
Geopolitical Acts (GPA) in place of GPRSHOCKS. The reaction of world-wide stock
returns to GPASHOCKS is actually slightly positive, though not statistically significant.
Meanwhile, when using GPTSHOCKS, the world-wide stock market unequivocally has a
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significant negative reaction. They note that returns generally respond asymmetrically
to the shocks to geopolitical threats compared to the realization of those threats in the
form of shocks to geopolitical action.
Finally, Caldara et al. examine the reaction of several industries in the U.S. to the 9
largest movements in the geopolitical risk indexes. Some industries, like Defense, which
likely have direct exposure to geopolitical risk, experience short-term positive excess re-
turns over the SP 500, but most industries experiences short-term negative excess returns,
with all effects dissipating within three months.
As seen, Caldara et al. only examine the relationship between shocks to geopolitical
risk and market returns rather than the level of risk itself. They use a simple AR(1) model
to determine the expected value of risk every month and the corresponding “shock” to
risk, as measured by the residual of the expected versus realized level of geopolitical risk.
We now provide an overview of literature on the effect of shocks to factors on returns.
Then, we examine literature that provides justification for the AR(1) model used by
Calara et al. as being representative of how investors form expectations of geopolitical
risk, thus permitting viewing the residuals as shocks.
2.2 Literature on Expectations and Shocks to Factors
Schneider et al. observe that there is a much more negative market reaction when an
unexpected conflict occurs versus an expected conflict. This is understood with a rational
expectations framework, where investors include every piece of relevant information into
their decision making. If a conflict is expected to occur, this information is already
incorporated into investors’ decisions and therefore the occurrence of the event will have
minimal impact. The only effect results from how different the realized conflict is from
the expected conflict. If, however, the conflict is not expected, the realization of the
conflict will have a much larger impact as the new information is incorporated into prices.
Let’s take an example of an expected future conflict or cooperation between geopolitical
entities. If investors expect a conflict to occur, the realization of the conflict can still be
different from what they expected. As Schneider et al. found in the context of armed
conflict, for expected conflicts the reaction of the market depends on if the realization of
the conflict was better or worse than expected, regardless of if the realization was positive
(cooperative) or negative (conflictive). In all cases, they attribute any impact of events
to result from the event occurring differently than expected or simply not being expected
at all.
The effect of expected and unexpected events on returns is closely related to Ross’
(1976) arbitrage pricing theory, where realized returns of a security are explained by
the difference between the expected and realized values of factors and the corresponding
sensitivity of the security to each factor. “Factor” here can refer to any measurable
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metric, such as the value of GDP, unemployment rate, or the level of geopolitical risk.
It’s helpful to visualize this in the form of a model. In equation 2, the excess returns of
security i are explained by the deviation of a realized factor F˜ from its expected value,
E[F˜ ], in time period t and the security’s sensitivity, βi, to this factor.
r˜i,t − rf,t = αi + βi(F˜t − E[F˜t]) + i,t (2)
Commonly, the arbitrage pricing theory assumes that only deviations in a factor
impacts returns, as given in the model above. The logic goes that the value of the factor
itself does not impact returns, but rather if its realization is different from its expected
value. This appears to be the assumption taken by Caldara et al., where they only
examine the effect of shocks to geopolitical risk on market indexes.
Since our study is largely focused on shocks to geopolitical risk, we want to establish
confidence that the AR(1) model used by Caldara et al. is a reasonable method to
determine shocks to geopolitical risk. Caldara et al. determine shocks to geopolitical risk
rather simply. The expectation of the level of geopolitical risk is estimated for every month
by relying on the most recent month and the overall trend of geopolitical risk.6 While
seemingly naive, there are no better models yet for how investors form expectations of
geopolitical risk and evidence suggests that the simple model used is fairly representative
of reality. Studies indicate investors have short memories when it comes to geopolitical
events, often relying on the present and recent history to form expectations of future
geopolitical risk. Furthermore, major clashes between large geopolitical entities seem so
impossible in the current era that investors all but ignore the possibility of significant
changes in geopolitical risk. Many large geopolitical risks, such as the possibility of nuclear
war, don’t seem to be considered by investors because the costs would be so extreme as
to make portfolio reallocation useless. 7 In other words, investors aren’t very forward-
looking in forming their expectations of geopolitical risk. Furthermore, Schneider et al.
found in their case studies that most conflictive events were not expected by the market
at all, rather coming as completely unexpected. This makes sense intuitively given the
nature of geopolitics, where a priori knowledge of terrorist attacks, nuclear weapon tests,
or the decision to deploy troops in a foreign country would rarely be available to investors
at large. All this points to investors heavily relying on the current level of geopolitical risk
to form their expectations of future risk, which aligns with the model used by Caldara
and Iacoviello. The AR(1) model adds a bit more complexity by positing that investors
take into consideration the overall trend of geopolitical risk to inform their expectations,
which seems reasonable to us. With this in mind, we have confidence that the AR(1)
process is a reasonable methodology to determine shocks to geopolitical risk.
6The exact specification is given in equation 4
7Ferguson (2008) Kahn and Tananbaum, Council on Foreign Relations (2014)
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2.3 Literature on Calculating the Price of Factors
The price of a factor, often also referred to as risk premium, indicates how much investors
can expect to be compensated for taking on additional exposure to the factor. Fama and
MacBeth (1973) formally test if investors expect compensation for taking on more risk.
They examine the portfolio theory that the pricing of securities reflect risk-averse investors
attempting to hold efficient portfolios in terms of returns and risk. “Efficient” here means
that no other portfolio exists with a higher expected return and lower or equivalent risk.
A risk-averse investor, therefore, would only take on additional risk if they expected to be
compensated for that risk, indicated by a significant risk premium. They measure risk via
securities’ sensitivity to the market risk premium and then create a two-parameter model
to determine if higher sensitivity to the market risk premium leads to higher expected
returns (observed future returns proxy expected returns). They find a significant risk
premium, where securities with higher risk are characterized by higher expected returns.
The risk premium found by Fama and MacBeth on the market factor can be translated
to factor models in general. Corresponding to equation 2, expected returns of a security
are determined by the sensitivity of the security to the factor and the risk premium of
the factor. Thus, the more sensitive a security is to a factor, and the higher the risk
premium of the factor, the higher the expected return of the security. This specification
is presented in equation 3:
E[ri,t] = rf,t + λiβi (3)
Practically, this means that if a risk-averse investor knows a factor exists that affects
returns, they expect higher returns for taking on a security that is more sensitive to
changes in this factor.8 A positive risk premium indicates that investors expect to be
compensated for taking on more positive exposure to the factor, while a negative risk
premium indicates they expect to be compensated for taking more negative exposure to
the factor.
A final note is that even if a factor impacts returns, it’s not guaranteed that this
factor will command a significant risk premium. Some factors, though they might impact
returns, do not concern investors sufficiently so as to demand a significant risk premium.9
2.4 Literature on Geopolitical Threats versus Geopolitical
Actions
Lastly, the literature indicates the importance of separating geopolitical actions from
geopolitical threats. Schneider et al. specifically examine the case of armed conflicts,
8The theory is based on the idea that investors must be proportionally compensated for taking on
additional risk in order to prevent arbitrage.
9Dolinar, Orsag, Suman (2015), Bodie, Kane, and Marcus 2001, 311.
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which can be thought of as geopolitical actions. They find that often the intensifica-
tion of a conflict can have a positive impact on markets. Increases in conflict “whose
anticipated costs lift the uncertainty over the future course of action and promise a less
costly resolution of the conflict than originally anticipated” have a positive impact on the
market. Thus, an increase in conflict can limit the uncertainty of possible future actions.
Caldara et al. reference the findings of Schneider et al. to explain why shocks to geopo-
litical action appears to have a slightly positive, though insignificant, relationship with
market index returns. They posit that threats increase uncertainty regarding future ac-
tions, while actions tend to decrease uncertainty. Furthermore, they think that investors
might form expectations based on worst case probabilities, and actions tend to stave off
some of these worst cases. Meanwhile, threats tend to create more worst case scenarios.
10 In light of this, we think it is important to disentangle the impacts of geopolitical
actions and geopolitical threats in any empirical analysis. Furthermore, it’s not clear to
us that it’s the shocks to geopolitical actions that reduces uncertainty. It’s possible that
a higher level of geopolitical action reduces uncertainty rather than the shock itself. For
robustness, we include the level of geopolitical threats and actions in our analysis.
This motivates our use of four measures of geopolitical risk: the level of geopolitical
threats, the level of geopolitical actions, shocks to geopolitical threats, and shocks to
geopolitical actions.
3 Contribution to Literature
Outside of the initial analyses by Caldara et al. described, there is no literature that
empirically examines the relationship between the geopolitical risk indexes and the U.S.
stock market.
While Caldara et al. find some significant relationships between geopolitical risk
and market index returns, their analysis begs the question if geopolitical risk maintains
unique explanatory power when commonly accepted proxies of risk are controlled for.
Our first contribution to the literature is to address if the impact of geopolitical risk
on the U.S. stock market is unique when controlling for the Fama and French (2015)
5-factors. The model created by Fama and French (2015) is one of the most well-known
and accepted asset-pricing models.11 The factors in this five-factor model are 1) Market
risk premium(Mkt-rf); 2) Small market capitalization Minus Big market capitalization
(SMB); 3) High book/market ratio Minus Low book/market ratio (HML); 4) Robust
Minus Weak profitability (RMW); and 5) Conservative Minus Aggressive investment
10Ilut and Schneider (2014)
11The five-factor model did not add much explanatory power to the three-factor model, but we use
the five-factor model for robustness. Furthermore, they found the factor HML to be redundant in the
5-factor model.
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(CMA) 12. In the “What is Geopolitical Risk?” section, our initial analysis reveals there
are some significant relationships between geopolitical risk and the 5-factors. We further
investigate by examining the ability of geopolitical risk to explain returns when included
alongside the 5-factors. For returns, we use 25 portfolios created by Fama and French
that are sorted based on Size and Book-Market factors, which they’ve found to be the
two most important factors in asset pricing. 13 In the “What is Geopolitical Risk?”
section, these portfolios mainly operate to limit noise from individual security returns
and then determine if geopolitical risk is widely unique from the Fama-French 5-factors.
The portfolios provide us with a wide dispersion of returns and allow insight into if each
measure of geopolitical risk affects returns across the entire stock market, despite some
of the most important characteristics in explaining returns. We create several variations
of a model to explain returns while controlling for the effect of the 5-factors on returns.
We find that the 5-factors largely take away explanatory power from the measures of
geopolitical risk.14
Our second contribution to the literature is separating out the impacts of the level
of each geopolitical risk measure from shocks. The literature has largely assumed that
only shocks to geopolitical risk will impact returns. As highlighted before, there is rea-
son to think though that the level of risk itself might have a unique impact on returns
when controlling for shocks to geopolitical risk. We find this is important in the case
of geopolitical actions, where the level itself positively and significantly impacts returns
when controlling for shocks.
Our third, and most important, contribution to the literature is estimating the price
of each measure of geopolitical risk. The price of risk, or risk premium, is calculated by
performing cross-sectional regressions on portfolio returns and the estimated coefficients
of each portfolio’s returns to each measure of geopolitical risk. Several versions of the
cross-sectional regression are created to control for the price of the 5-factors and separate
12The market risk premium factor is the same as used in the traditional CAPM. According to Fama
and French, the additional factors are constructed in the following way: “The Size and value factors
use independent sorts of stocks into two Size groups and three B/M groups (independent 2x3 sorts).
The Size breakpoint is the NYSE median market cap, and the B/M breakpoints are the 30th and 70th
percentiles of B/M for NYSE stocks. The intersections of the sorts produce six VW portfolios. The Size
factor, SMBBM , is the average of the three small stock portfolio returns minus the average of the three
big stock portfolio returns. The value factor HML is the average of the two high B/M portfolio returns
minus the average of the two low B/M portfolio returns.”
13According to Fama and French (2015) these portfolios are created as follows: “At the end of each
June, stocks are allocated to five Size groups (Small to Big) using NYSE market cap breakpoints. Stocks
are allocated independently to five B/M groups (Low to High), again using NYSE breakpoints. The
intersections of the two sorts produce 25 value-weight Size-B/M portfolios. In the sort for June of year
t, B is book equity at the end of the fiscal year ending in year t1 and M is market cap at the end of
December of year t1, adjusted for changes in shares outstanding between the measurement of B and the
end of December ”
14As will be emphasized later, this finding is not surprising in light of the findings of Chen et al. They
too observe that their macroeconomic factors lose much significance in explaining time-series returns
when included alongside the market factor.
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out the pricing of the level and shocks to each measure of geopolitical risk. We find that
the level of geopolitical action is significantly and negatively priced over the entire testing
period. 15
4 Data
4.1 Geopolitical Risk Data
There are three main variations of the geopolitical risk index created by Caldara et al.:
the composite Geopolitical Risk index (GPR), Geopolitical Threat index (GPT), and
Geopolitical Action index (GPA). Each index ranges from January 1985 to the most
recent month.16 For the purpose of our study, we use data from January 1985-December
2016. Caldara et al. cover in depth the risks each of these indexes are intended to capture;
it will suffice to provide a brief overview. We define “geopolitics” and “geopolitical risk”
in the same manner as Caldara et al. Their guiding motivation is to “identify situations
in which the power struggle of agents over territories cannot be resolved peacefully and
democratically.” To this end, they define geopolitical risk as the “risk associated with
wars, terrorist acts, and tensions between states that affect the normal and peaceful
course of international relations.” Included within this definition are both the risks that
future events will happen, called “threats”, and the risks that stem from the occurrence
of events themselves, called “actions”.
The geopolitical risk indexes are created by counting the occurrences of articles dis-
cussing geopolitics according to their definition in major English-language newspapers.
The index then is calculated by dividing the number of articles discussing geopolitical
risks by the number of published articles. The indexes are normalized to a value of 100
in the 2000-2009 decade. An index value of 200 then means there are twice as many
newspaper mentions of rising geopolitical risk in that month as during the 2000s. Several
different sets of key words are created to search in the newspaper articles to determine if
that article should be added to the index. By using different sets of key words in these
searches, they are able to separate geopolitical threats in the form of the GPT index and
15One concern that arises from this methodology is that we do not know if there will be significant
dispersion across the portfolios in the marginal effect of exposure (i.e. the estimated coefficient on
geopolitical risk) to geopolitical risk on returns. To alleviate this concern, we redo the second-pass,
except this time we create our own portfolios, sorted according to securities’ sensitivity to each measure
of geopolitical risk. This methodology directly follows that of Fama and MacBeth, where they form 20
portfolios based on securities’ sensitivities to the market risk premium to determine if securities with
higher risk also entail higher expected returns. With this methodology, we can ensure that the portfolios
vary significantly in the marginal effect of exposure to each measure of geopolitical risk on returns.
An overall agreement between these two methodologies would give us more confidence in our results.
Though, as Chen et al. noted, different portfolio sorts tend to make significant results insignificant, so
we do not expect complete agreement between the results of the two methodologies.
16Note they also create historical indexes that go back to 1900, which rely on significantly less news-
papers. We choose to focus on the more contemporary time period starting in 1985.
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geopolitical actions in the GPA index. As already discussed, we only examine the GPT
and GPA indexes instead of the composite GPR index due to literature that indicates
the importance of disentangling the effects of each.
Caldara et al. use an AR(1) model to determine shocks to these indexes every month.
That is:
GPt = α + γ(GPt−1) + t (4)
GPt is a stand in for a given level of geopolitical risk (GPT or GPA) in month t. A
simple regression is run where the prior month, t-1 predicts the next month’s level of
risk. The residual of each month, that is the difference between the expected and realized
level of geopolitical risk each month, is then set as the shock to geopolitical risk (GPT
or GPA) for the month. We use this same procedure to calculate the shock to GPT and
GPA for every month from February 1985- December 2016.
4.2 Portfolio Return Data
We use 25 portfolios created by Fama and French as our measure of returns. These
portfolios were created by sorting all securities in the CRSP universe into 5 portfolios
according to their Size and 5 according to their Book-Market value. The intersection
of these portfolios thus create the 25 portfolios sorted on Size and Book-Market value.
17 For example, at one extreme a portfolio contains securities with the lowest Size and
lowest Book-Market values, while at the other end a portfolio contains securities with
the highest Size and highest Book-Market value. We use monthly portfolio return data
during the same time frame as the geopolitical risk index data is available, from January
1985 to December 2016.
In our analysis, these portfolios are labeled numerically from portfolio 25 to portfolio
1. Examining the interaction of the individual traits of portfolios with geopolitical risk
is beyond the scope of this study, but certainly is a necessary area of future study.
The characteristics of each portfolio are provided in the Appendix in table 11. In the
first-pass regressions, these portfolios mainly operate to limit the idiosyncratic risk of
individual securities. These portfolios serve a more important role in the second-pass
cross-sectional regressions, where we determine the price of each measure of geopolitical
risk. Here, we must have portfolios with a wide dispersion of expected returns to improve
the discriminatory power of the cross-sectional tests. Chen et al. sort securities into
portfolios based on Size, a well-established indicator of expected returns, to accomplish
this end. Similarly, we use the Fama-French portfolios sorted on Size and Book-Market
value, which they have demonstrated to have large dispersions in expected returns.
17Exact details are discussed in footnote 13
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5 What is Geopolitical Risk?
5.1 Is Geopolitical Risk Unique?
It is possible that other factors already capture risk associated with geopolitical risk,
resulting in geopolitical risk not maintaining significant explanatory power when other
known proxies of risk are controlled. The unconditional correlations, along with the
significance of these correlations are provided in table 1 between the four geopolitical risk
measures and the 5-factors used in the Fama-French model. We see that the 5-factors
mostly have significant correlations with each other. But, as Fama and French have
shown, each factor still adds unique explanatory power to the model with the exception of
HML, so correlations don’t preclude significance in the model. Any relationship observed
between the 5-factors and geopolitical risk likely stems from geopolitical risk since it’s
purely exogenous while the 5-factors are based on security returns.
The market risk premium factor (Mkt- rf) does not have a significant correlation with
the level of GPT or GPA, but it does have a significant negative correlation with shocks
GPT. The aforementioned study by Caldara et al. would lead us to expect this result–
one of their major findings was that a significant relationship exists between shocks to
the GPT index and world-wide stock and market index returns. Also in line with their
findings, shocks to the GPA index do not have a significant correlation with the market
risk premium and the correlation is slightly positive unlike the negative sign on shocks
to GPT.
Table 1 Correlation Matrix
Correlation
Mkt-rf SMB HML RMW CMA GPT Level GPT Shock GPA Level GPA Shock
Mkt-rf 1.0000
SMB 0.1976 1.0000
HML -0.2235 -0.1248 1.0000
RMW -0.3651 -0.4454 0.3289 1.0000
CMA -0.3833 -0.0649 0.6684 0.2090 1.0000
GPT Level -0.0314 0.0233 -0.1225 0.0065 -0.1075 1.0000
GPT Shock -0.1137 0.0039 -0.0717 0.1082 -0.1004 0.6611 1.0000
GPA Level 0.0304 0.0841 -0.1045 -0.0270 -0.0800 0.5547 0.2006 1.0000
GPA Shock -0.0482 0.0358 -0.0890 0.0517 -0.0838 0.4737 0.3746 0.8256 1.0000
Significance
Mkt-rf 1.0000
SMB 0.0001 1.0000
HML 0.0000 0.0133 1.0000
RMW 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
CMA 0.0000 0.1994 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
GPT Level 0.5345 0.6456 0.0151 0.8979 0.0332 1.0000
GPT Shock 0.0242 0.9389 0.1558 0.0320 0.0467 0.0000 1.0000
GPA Level 0.5482 0.0958 0.0384 0.5938 0.1131 0.0000 0.0001 1.0000
GPA Shock 0.3403 0.4792 0.0782 0.3067 0.0971 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
As documented by Caldara et al., all the measures of geopolitical risk have relatively
high correlations with each other as a result of them being derived from similar search
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words. However, as they have shown, each one still captures unique information related
to geopolitical risk.
We cannot draw too many conclusions from just these correlations, but it is impor-
tant to note already that it appears some relationships exist between the 5-factors and
geopolitical risk.
To determine if there is still significant variation in the geopolitical risk measures
from the Fama-French 5-factors, we examine the ability of geopolitical risk to explain
movements in each of the 5-factors. We don’t attempt to provide theory behind why
geopolitical risk would affect certain factors and not others, but rather our aim is to
simply establish from the outset that geopolitical risk is largely unique from the 5-factors.
Table 2 provides the coefficients and significance from each measure of geopolitical risk
regressed on each individual factor.
Table 2 Geopolitical Risk Regressed on Each Fama-French Factor
Level GPT Level GPA GPTSHOCK GPASHOCK
Mkt-rf
Coeff. -0.002 0.002 -0.012 -0.004
T-stat -0.671 0.555 -2.013 -0.899
SMB
Coeff. 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002
T-stat 0.532 1.754 0.200 0.821
HML
Coeff. -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
T-stat -2.530 -1.874 -1.599 -1.750
RMW
Coeff. 0.000 -0.001 0.006 0.002
T-stat 0.119 -0.449 2.159 0.956
CMA
Coeff. -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003
T-stat -1.731 -1.258 -1.560 -1.287
Again, we see several significant relationships between geopolitical risk and the Fama-
French factors, though the coefficients are all fairly small. Finally, we include all Famma-
French 5-factors and regress these on each geopolitical risk measure. The specific results
from this regression are not necessary to discuss, but the R2 values range from 0.017 for
the level of GPA to 0.046 for shocks to GPT. It’s safe to conclude that each measure of
geopolitical risk is largely unique in its variation from the 5-factors.
5.2 Geopolitical Risk as a Factor in the Fama-French 5-Factor
Model
5.2.1 Methodology
Having determined that each measure of geopolitical risk is somewhat unique from the
5-factors in their variation, we now turn to asking if geopolitical risk contains unique
explanatory power from the 5-factors in stock returns. As outlined in section 4.2, we
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use 25 portfolios created by Fama and French as our return data. The main goal of this
section is to better understand the differences between the relationship of the each of
the four measures of geopolitical risk (level of GPT and GPA and their respective shock
measures) with returns, along with if they maintain unique explanatory power when
included alongside the 5-factors. While examining if the relationship between geopolitical
risk and returns varies across the portfolios is intriguing, it’s beyond the scope of the
current study. We test two main models. First, we include each geopolitical risk measure
by itself in a time-series regression to explain portfolio returns. This specification is given
in equation 5:
rpt = αi + γpGPt + p,t (5)
where p=1,2,...,25
rpt is the monthly returns of portfolio p from January 1985 to December 2016, GPt is
the monthly measure of geopolitical risk over the same horizon, and γp is the coefficient
of the relationship between the returns of portfolio p and the measure of geopolitical
risk. This regression is performed with each of the 25 portfolios and for each of the four
measures of geopolitical risk.
Then, we add the measure of geopolitical risk alongside the 5-factors in equation 6:
rpt = αp+βp(Mktt−rf,t)+Sp(SMBt)+Hp(HMLt)+Rp(RMWt)+Cp(CMAt)+γpGPt+p,t
(6)
where p=1,2,...,25
rpt is the monthly returns of portfolio p from January 1985 to December 2016, GPt is
the monthly measure of geopolitical risk over the same horizon, and γp is the coefficient
of the relationship between the portfolio returns and the geopolitical risk measure. βp,
Sp, Hp, Rp, and Cp are the coefficients on the 5-factors for each portfolio.
Finally, we include the level of geopolitical risk and shocks to geopolitical risk in the
same regression to disentangle their effects. When the shocks and levels are included in
the same regressions, we use the level of geopolitical risk in time t-1 in place of the level
of geopolitical risk in time t. The level of geopolitical risk in time t already includes
the shock itself in time t, so it’s necessary to disentangle the two. To avoid an errors-
in-variables problem, we opt to just use the level of geopolitical risk in t-1 instead of
the estimated expected level. This isolates what can be attributed purely to the level of
risk versus shocks. As discussed earlier, we think there is reason to believe that the level
of geopolitical risk impacts asset returns uniquely from shocks to geopolitical risk– any
model then that doesn’t include both might be misspecified. Equations 7 and 8 give this
specification:
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rp,t = αp + γlevelpGPLEV ELt−1 + γshockpGPSHOCKtp,t (7)
rp,t = αp+βp(Mktt−rf,t)+Sp(SMBt)+Hp(HMLt)+Rp(RMWt)+Cp(CMAt)+γlevelpGPLevelt−1+γshockpGPSHOCKt+p,t
(8)
where p=1,2,...,25
5.2.2 Results
Tables 12 and 13 display the full results in the Appendix 18 from equations 5 and 6. For
ease of analysis, we summarize these results in table 3.
Table 3 Summary of Regression Results from Equations 5 and 6
At 80% Level At 95% level Avg. γ̂
GPT Only 7 1 -0.0036
GPT Shock Only 24 11 -0.0149
GPA Only 4 0 0.0041
GPA Shock Only 4 2 -0.0034
GPT +Factors 5 1 -0.0002
GPT Shock+Factors 6 1 -0.0018
GPA+Factors 6 2 0.0011
GPA Shock+Factors 2 2 0.0003
In table 3, we present the number of portfolios significant at the 80 % and 95 %
confidence level for each regression, along with the average estimated coefficient, γ̂, across
portfolios on the measure of geopolitical risk.
The only measure of geopolitical risk where the γ̂ is consistently statistically different
form 0 is shocks to GPT. However, when shocks to GPT is included alongside the 5-factors
in the regression, it loses all significance. The γ̂ on shocks to GPT is still negative, but
it is of much lower magnitude when included alongside the 5-factors. Both the level and
shocks to GPA demonstrate a positive relationship with returns on average. Meanwhile,
both the level and shocks to GPT demonstrate a negative relationship with returns.
However, there is not a statistically significant relationship except when shocks to GPT
is included by itself in the regression.
Tables 14 and 15 display the full results in the Appendix 19 from equations 7 and 8,
where both the level of geopolitical risk and shocks to geopolitical risk are included in
the same regression to isolate the effect of each. Again for ease of analysis, we summarize
these results in table 4.
18Note for ease of presentation, we only display the coefficient and statistical significance of geopolitical
risk in the model. Fama and French have already extensively studied the 5-factors in the context of these
portfolios. Full results are available upon request.
19Again, we only display the coefficient and statistical significance of geopolitical risk in the model.
Fama and French have already extensively studied the 5-factors in the context of these portfolios. Full
results are available upon request.
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Table 4 Summary of Regression Results from Equations 7 and 8
At 80% Level At 95% level Average γ̂
GPT + GPT Shock
GPT Level 4 0 0.0038
GPT Shock 24 16 -0.0149
GPA + GPA Shock
GPA Level 24 22 0.0207
GPA Shock 3 1 -0.0034
GPT + GPT Shock+ Factors
GPT Level 6 3 0.0006
GPT Shock 6 1 -0.0018
GPA + GPA Shock+ Factors
GPA Level 12 4 0.0028
GPA Shock 2 0 0.0003
Our results when including both the level and shocks to geopolitical risk in the same
regression highlight the importance of disentangling their effects on returns. Most no-
tably, the level of GPA becomes significant in explaining returns in many of the portfolios
when the 5-factors are not included. When shocks were not controlled for, the level was
not significant in any portfolio. Recall, Caldara et al. also studied the relationship be-
tween market index returns and shocks to GPA. They found that shocks to GPA have a
slightly positive, though insignificant relationship with returns. In light of these results,
it seems that their model might be misspecified. Shocks to GPA don’t seem to impact
returns, but higher levels have a significant and positive relationship with returns.
When the 5-factors are included alongside the level and shocks to GPA , most of the
explanatory power dissipates, though the level of GPA does maintain significance in 4
portfolios.
These results make several points clear regarding the two types of geopolitical risk,
GPT and GPA, and the differences between the levels and shocks to these measures. First,
geopolitical threats and geopolitical actions have different relationships with returns. The
level of GPA has a significant positive relationship with returns when the shocks are
controlled for. Shocks to GPT has a significant negative relationship with returns, while
shocks to GPA largely is insignificant.
In all cases, including the 5-factors takes away most explanatory power. This finding
is not very surprising and is similar to what Chen et al. found in their study of economic
factors and the stock market. They too found that while their factors had some ex-
planatory power in portfolio returns by themselves, much of this explanatory power was
lost when the market factor was included in the time-series regression. They highlight
that while the market factor was very significant in explaining time series returns, “their
estimated exposures (their betas) do not explain cross-sectional differences in average re-
turns after the betas of the economic state variables have been included.” They continue
that, “This suggests that the ”explanatory power” of the market indices may have less to
do with economics and more to do with the statistical observation that large, positively
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weighted portfolios of random variables are correlated.” As noted, the 5-factors are cre-
ated using security returns, so it is not shocking that these factors take away explanatory
power from the geopolitical risk measures in the time-series regressions. Despite the loss
of significance in explaining returns, Chen et al. still found many of their factors to be
significantly priced.
Lastly, and closely related to the first point, it can be important to disentangle the
effects of the level of geopolitical risk versus shocks to geopolitical risk, especially for GPA.
We find that when controlling for shocks to GPA, the level of GPA is actually significant
in explaining returns across most portfolios (when the 5-factors are not included). This
can be understood within the frameworks provided by Schneider and Troeger and Ilut
and Schneider. Schneider and Troeger attributed the intensification of armed conflict
to reducing uncertainty and staving off worst-case scenarios, and therefore positively
impacting returns. However, it’s likely they were witnessing investors reacting positively
to the higher level of armed conflict rather than the process of intensification itself. It
seems the process of intensification, which is similar to what we call shocks to GPA,
largely has no impact on returns. It doesn’t appear to be as important to separate out
the level and shocks to GPT. We do not attempt to add to the existing literature as to
why the stock market reacts this way, but this is further evidence that it’s important to
separate the effects of levels and shocks to geopolitical risk.
6 Is Geopolitical Risk Priced?
6.1 2nd Pass on 25 Fama-French Portfolios
In the previous section, we confirmed the importance of distinguishing between geopolit-
ical actions and geopolitical threats. Furthermore, we found that it might be necessary
to include both the level of geopolitical risk and shocks to geopolitical risk in the same
regression to isolate the effects of each. When not controlling for the 5-factors, shocks
to GPT and the level of GPA are significant factors in explaining returns. However, this
significance largely disappears when controlling for the 5-factors.
Now we turn to formally addressing the question, “Is Geopolitical Risk Price?”. To
this end, we perform a Fama-MacBeth two-pass regression to determine the price of risk,
also known as risk premium, on each measure of geopolitical risk.
6.1.1 Methodology
The Fama-MacBeth two-pass regression is one of the most widely used methods for calcu-
lating the risk premium on a factor.20 The methodology is as follows. First, we calculate
20Fama MacBeth (1973) first used it to determine risk premium of the market factor; Chen, Ross, and
Roll (1986) used it to determine risk premium on several macroeconomic factors. Many other studies
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the initial exposure of every portfolios’ returns to the risk factors, in our case the 5-factors
and each measure of geopolitical risk. “Exposure” here simply means the estimated co-
efficient from an OLS regression of portfolio returns and the factor(s).21 These estimated
coefficients then are used as the initial independent variables in the second-pass cross-
sectional regressions during a 3 year Testing Period.22 In total, we evaluate 10 unique
Testing Periods as outlined in table 5. Note each Testing Period corresponds with an
Initial Estimation Period, where the initial exposures of each portfolio to the geopolitical
risk measures, along with the 5-factors, are estimated.23 Then, for every month t in the
Testing Period, the following cross-sectional regression is run:
16:
Rpt = λ0t + λγ,tγ̂p,t−12 + pt (9)
where p=1,2,...,25
The γ̂p,t−12 is the initial estimated coefficient on the given measure of geopolitical risk
(either level of GPT, level of GPA, shock to GPT, or shock to GPA). Note that every
year this estimation is updated to include the most recent year of data. For example, in
Period 1, portfolio return and geopolitical risk data from January 1985- December 1987
are used to calculate the initial γ̂p value for each portfolio. These γ̂p values are used in
the 12 cross sectional regressions corresponding to the 12 months in 1988, the first year
of the Testing Period. In 1989, the second year of the Testing Period, these γ̂p values
are updated to include the year 1988 (i.e. the exposure is calculated using data from
1985-1988). Then, in 1990, the third and final year of the Testing Period, the γ̂p values
are updated once again to include data from 1989.24
These cross-sectional regressions result in an estimated λ̂γ,t value for every month t in
the Testing Period, which, like Fama and MacBeth and Chen, Ross, and Roll, we term the
risk premium of risk in that month (in this case, geopolitical risk). We can then average
these λ̂γ,t values across every month in the Testing Period to arrive at the average risk
premium of geopolitical risk for the Testing Period. We then test if the average λ̂γ, the
price of risk, for each Testing period is statistically different from 0 using equation 10:
have used their methodology according to Petersen (2007).
21Standard procedure is 3-5 years of data to calculate the estimated coefficient.
22The exact length of the Testing Period varies across studies. Fama and MacBeth use a 3 year period,
while Chen, Ross, and Roll use a 1 year period.
23The estimated coefficients are calculated in a time-series regression with the same variables that
are used in the second-pass cross-sectional regression. For example, if the second-pass is only run with
the estimated coefficient of the level of GPT as the independent variable, then we also calculated this
coefficient with only the level of GPT as the variable in the time-series regression. Likewise, if a second-
pass regression uses all the coefficients of all 5-factors along with the level and shock to GPT, then these
coefficients were initially estimated alongside each other in the same time-series regression.
24This follows the methodology of Fama and MacBeth (1973)
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t(λ̂γ) = λ̂γ/(std(λ̂γ)/
√
n) (10)
Where n is the number of months (i.e. observations) in the Testing Period
Along with finding the average λ̂γ,t values and statistical significance for every Testing
Period, we also find the average λ̂γ,t and significance over the entire period from January
1988-December 2016. As noted by Fama and MacBeth, the pricing tends to be quite
volatile over short time periods. As such, they pay more attention to the significance of
the risk premium over the entire time period since there is a higher sample size.
Table 5 Estimation and Testing Periods
Period # 1 2 3 4 5
Initial Estimation Period................ 1985-87 1988-90 1991-1993 1994-96 1997-99
Testing Period............................... 1988-90 1991-93 1994-96 1997-99 2000-02
Period # 6 7 8 9 10
Initial Estimation Period................ 2000-02 2003-05 2006-08 2009-11 2012-14
Testing Period............................... 2003-05 2006-08 2009-11 2012-14 2015-16
Several variations of the cross-sectional regression in equation 16 are run. Namely,
a cross-sectional regression is run for every month t in the Testing Periods where the
estimated coefficients on the 5-factors are included alongside that of geopolitical risk in
equation 17:
Rpt = λ0t+λβ,tβ̂p,t−12+λS,t ̂Sp, t− 12+λH,tĤp,t−12+λR,tR̂p,t−12+λC,tĈp,t−12+λγ,tγ̂p,t−12+pt
(11)
where p=1,2,...,25
We do not display the estimated λ̂ values and significance of the 5-factors, but we
include the 5-factors to determine the risk premium on geopolitical risk when the 5-factors
are controlled.25
Equations 16 and 17 are modified to include both the coefficients on the level of
geopolitical risk and shocks to geopolitical risk in the same cross sectional-regression.26
As we saw in section 5, the level and shocks uniquely impact returns, so it’s important
to disentangle their risk premiums. These specifications are given in footnote 27.
25Full results are available upon request.
26We estimate the coefficient for the level and shocks to geopolitical risk using the same specification
in equation 7 and 8
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Rpt = λ0t + λγlevel,t ̂γplevel,t−12 + λγshock,t ̂γpshock,t−12 + pt (12)
and
Rpt = λ0t+λβ,t̂βp,t−12+λS,t ̂Sp, t− 12+λH,tĤp,t−12+λR,tR̂p,t−12+λC,tĈp,t−12+λγlevel,t ̂γplevel,t−12+λγshock,t ̂γpshock,t−12+pt
(13)
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The Fama and MacBeth methodology provides standard errors corrected for cross-
sectional correlation, but not time-series correlation. Though, a sizable portion of fi-
nance papers that use a two-parameter model do not correct for time-series correlation.28
Petersen (2009) demonstrates that often the standard errors resulting from the Fama
and MacBeth methodology are biased downward, thus upwardly biasing the significance.
There are several possible methods of correcting standard errors for time-series correla-
tion. Petersen compares many of the methods and recommends a methodology similar
to Newey-West (1987) and Abarbanell and Bernard (2000). We opt to use the method-
ology recommended by Petersen to correct our standard errors. The resulting corrected
t-statistics are presented in italics next to the uncorrected statistics that result from the
Fama-MacBeth methodology.29 The corrections largely do not change the interpretation
of our results, and for ease of exposition we mostly reference the uncorrected t-statistics
unless the corrected version changes the interpretation.
Finally, we are aware that we do not directly address the “errors-in-variables” problem
in this methodology. However, in a simple linear regression, errors-in-variables will bias
coefficients toward 0, thus reducing significance of the results. So, in the simplest form
of our model, where only the estimated coefficient of geopolitical risk is included in
the cross-sectional regression, any significant results we find can still be assumed to
have significance when accounting for measurement errors in the independent variable.
Along with this, we measure standard errors of the price of geopolitical risk by exploiting
the time-series variation in the estimated price of risk for every month in the Testing
Period rather than on any one price, decreasing the necessity of correcting for errors-in-
variables.30 Furthermore, accounting for errors-in-variables is less important when using
monthly data than annual data, as pointed out by Franzoni (2013). Lastly, in the second
cross-sectional methodology later in this section, we do more directly account for the
errors-in-variables problem. General agreement then between the two methodologies will
increase our confidence in the results.31
6.1.2 Results
First, we examine the results of the second-pass with regard to GPT. We only focus on
the price and significance over the entire period in table 6. The full results for each period
are presented in the Appendix in table 16.
Each Panel of the tables represents a variation of the cross-sectional regression used
to calculate the average price of risk, λ̂γ.
28Petersen (2009) found that 42 percent of finance papers published between 2002 and 2004 that used
a two-parameter model did not correct the standard errors for cross-sectional or time-series correlation.
29We are grateful to Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2010) for making their code publicly available.
30Franzoni (2013)
31We are aware of the Shanken (1993) correction for errors-in-variables. However, we had difficulty
finding publicly available code to perform this correction.
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Looking at Panel A,32 we see that the level of GPT is negatively priced, with a t-
statistic of -1.75 (corrected -1.54). In Panel B, shocks to GPT are also negatively priced
over the entire period, though with a t-statistic of only -0.56. In Panel C, the price of the
level and shocks to GPT are estimated in the same regression. Both remain negatively
priced, but insignificant.
In Panels D-F, we control for the prices of the 5-factors. In Panel D, the price of
the level of GPT remains negative and insignificant. Meanwhile, in Panel E the price of
shocks to GPT becomes slightly positive and still insignificant. Finally in Panel F, when
the price of both the level and shocks to GPT are estimated in the same regression and
the 5-factors are controlled for, the price of the level of GPT verges on significance with
a t-statistic of -1.90 (corrected t-statistic is -1.68.) The price of shocks to GPT remains
slightly positive and insignificant.
Table 6 Entire Period Average λ̂γ Values and Significance for GPT: Panel A displays the
average λ̂γ values when only the level of GPT is included in the regression. Panel B displays the average λ̂γ values when
only the shocks to GPT is included in the regression. Panel C displays the average λ̂γ values when the level and shocks to
GPT are included in the same regression. Panels D, E, and F correspond to Panels A, B, and C except that the estimated
coefficients of the 5-Factors are included in the cross sectional regressions alongside the measures of geopolitical threats
Panel A Panel B Panel C
̂λγlevel t(̂λγlevel ) t(̂λγlevel ) ̂λγshock t( ̂λγshock ) t( ̂λγshock ) ̂λγlevel ̂λγshock t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock ) t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock )
-12.4 -1.75 -1.54 -4.1 -0.56 -0.62 -9.4 -1.9 -1.11 -0.32 -0.96 -0.30
Panel E
Panel D Panel E Panel F
̂λγlevel t(̂λγlevel ) t(̂λγlevel ) ̂λγshock t( ̂λγshock ) t( ̂λγshock ) ̂λγlevel ̂λγshock t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock ) t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock )
-3.3 -0.55 -0.60 -1.7 0.54 0.59 -13.4 2.6 -1.90 0.58 -1.68 0.54
Next, we turn to the results with regard to GPA, summarized in table 7. The full
results are given in the Appendix in table 17. Again, each Panel represents a variation of
the cross-sectional regression used to calculate the average price of the level and shocks
to GPA for each Testing Period.
In Panel A, the level of GPA is negatively priced, though insignificant. Similarly, in
Panel B shocks to GPA is negatively priced and insignificant. In Panel C, when the price
of the level and shocks to GPA are estimated in the same regression, the price of each
remains negative and insignificant.
In Panels D-F, the prices of the 5-factors are controlled for. In panel D, the level
of GPA is negatively and significantly priced over the entire period, with a t-statistic of
-2.23 (-2.07 corrected). In Panel E, shocks to GPA also are negatively priced, though
insignificantly over the entire period. Lastly, in Panel F, the price of the level of GPA
remains negative and significant with a t-statistic of -2.46 (-2.18 corrected), while the
price of shocks to GPA remains negative and insignificant.
32Note the contents of each Panel are described in the title of the table.
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Table 7 Testing Period Average λ̂γ Values and Significance for GPA: Panel A displays the
average λ̂γ values when only the level of GPA is included in the regression. Panel B displays the average λ̂γ values when
only the shocks to GPA is included in the regression. Panel C displays the average λ̂γ values when the level and shocks to
GPA are included in the same regression. Panels D, E, and F correspond to Panels A, B, and C except that the estimated
coefficients of the 5-Factors are included in the cross sectional regressions alongside the measures of geopolitical action
Panel A Panel B Panel C
̂λγlevel t(̂λγlevel ) t(̂λγlevel ) ̂λγshock t( ̂λγshock ) t( ̂λγshock ) ̂λγlevel ̂λγshock t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock ) t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock )
-7.9 -0.97 -0.83 -5.5 -0.57 -0.51 -5.0 -9.5 -0.64 -1.13 -0.55 -0.91
Panel D Panel E Panel F
̂λγlevel t(̂λγlevel ) t(̂λγlevel ) ̂λγshock t( ̂λγshock ) t( ̂λγshock ) ̂λγlevel ̂λγshock t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock ) t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock )
-16.0 -2.23 -2.07 -7.5 -1.10 -1.13 -16.8 -7.7 -2.46 -1.27 -2.18 -1.13
6.1.3 Discussion and Implications of Results
In tables 6 and 7, we see that the level of GPA is the only measure that is significantly
priced over the entire period. Notably, in the time-series regressions in section 5,“What is
Geopolitical Risk?”, we also found that the the level of GPA most often maintains unique
explanatory power of returns when included alongside the 5-factors (and shocks to GPA
are controlled for). In the Appendix table 17, we observe that in the vast majority of
Testing Periods, across all versions of the cross-sectional regression, the level of GPA is
negatively priced. However, only for a couple periods is this pricing significant. This is
not shocking though. Fama and MacBeth also observed that the market risk premium is
only priced in a couple of their Testing Periods. They attribute this to the low sample size
and resulting higher variation in pricing that occurs within the individual time periods.
The overall time period then has a lower variation in pricing due to the higher sample
size–like them, we were most interested in if the risk is priced over the larger time period.
What does this negative risk premium on the level of GPA mean? Technically, it
means that portfolios with a more negative exposure to the level of GPA in one time
period tend to also have higher observed returns in a future time period, ceteris paribus.
As is common practice in the literature, we use actual observed future returns as a proxy
for “expected” returns. Recall that in a factor model we calculate expected returns by
multiplying the sensitivity of a portfolio to a factor by the risk premium of the factor.33
So if a factor has a negative risk premium, portfolios with a more negative exposure
have higher expected returns, ceteris paribus. (or more literally, are observed to have
higher returns in the future). For example, the price of the level of GPA is -73.46 for
the 2003-2005 Testing Period. In the previous estimation period, 2000-2002, the most
negative portfolio exposure to the level of GPA was -0.0274. Ceteris paribus, we then
would expect this portfolio to return 2 percent more per month than if it had 0 exposure
to the level of GPA! Obviously this is an extreme example–the 2003-2005 period had one
33See equation 3
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of the largest magnitude prices of the level of GPA and we are using the most negatively
exposed portfolio. On average, portfolios had an exposure of 0.0026 during the 2000-
2002 estimation period. Multiplying this by the price of -73.46 in the 2003-2005 Testing
Period, the average portfolio is expected to return 0.19 percent less per month, or 2.30
percent annualized, in the 2003-2005 period than if it had no exposure to the level of
GPA. This isn’t enormous, but it is not insignificant.
Let’s also look at the price of the level of GPA over the entire period, which is -16.8.
From 2015-2016, we find that the most negative portfolio exposure to the level of GPA
was -0.0280. Meanwhile, the most positive portfolio exposure to the level of GPA was
0.030. Multiplying the price of risk by the exposures, we find that the most negatively
exposed portfolio expects to return .974 percent more per month than the most positively
exposed portfolio. Again, this is an extreme case, but it demonstrates well that investors
might pay attention to their portfolio’s exposure to the level of GPA in light of these
results. We could perform a similar analysis with each measure of geopolitical risk, but
the level of GPA is the most significantly priced so we end our analysis here. The main
takeaway is that the price of the level of GPA is high enough, and portfolios are exposed
enough, to possibly make a tangible impact on expected returns.
We don’t posit a theory for why the risk premium is negative instead of positive. All
that we can say for certain is that, based on historical data, the exposure of a portfolio to
the level of GPA has a statistically significant impact on that portfolio’s future returns
even when controlling for known proxies of risk. Indeed, at first glance it might seem odd
that a portfolio with a more positive exposure to the level of GPA in one period expects
lower returns in future periods in light of the finding earlier that higher levels of GPA
have a positive relationship with returns. So why doesn’t a more positive exposure to
the level of GPA lead to higher returns? One explanation might be that higher levels of
GPA in one period also result in more shocks to GPT in future periods, which we have
seen generally depress returns. Caldara and Iacoviello observe that shocks to GPA also
tend to lead to future shocks to GPT, as the intensification of action is accompanied by
the intensification of threats. If a portfolio that was highly positively exposed to the level
of GPA is correspondingly negatively exposed to shocks to GPT, this portfolio would
demonstrate the results observed. We do not formally test if higher levels of GPA leads
to more shocks to GPT in the future, but this would be an interesting area of future
study.
Another possible interpretation is that lower levels of geopolitical action increase
uncertainty. Investors who want protection against this possibility will place a relatively
higher value on assets whose price increases when the level of action decreases and such
assets will carry a negative risk premium.34
Neither shocks to GPT or to GPA are significantly priced over the entire period in any
34This is more in-line with how Chen et al. interpret their results.
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of the Panels. The price of shocks to GPA nears significance over the entire time period
when controlling for the prices of the 5-factors and the level of GPA, with a t-statistic
of -1.27. As we will see when a different version of portfolio sorts is used in the second
methodology, the price of shocks to GPA becomes significantly and negatively priced over
the entire period in some versions of the cross-sectional regression.
.
6.2 2nd Pass on Portfolios Formed on Exposure to
Geopolitical Risk
For robustness, we redo the 2nd pass except now we create our own portfolios based on
securities’ exposures to each measure of geopolitical risk. This ensures that there is a
significant dispersion amongst the portfolios in their marginal exposure to each measure
of geopolitical risk. Our methodology directly follows Fama and MacBeth (1973), with
a few modifications to fit our purposes. Our task is very similar to theirs, where they
examine the price of risk (in their case market risk) based on the sorting of securities into
portfolios according to their sensitivity to this risk.
6.2.1 The Playing Field of Stocks
Our investable universe consists of all stocks in the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) database. This includes the NYSE, NYSE MKT, NASDAQ, and NYSE Arca
stock exchanges.35 This is the same pool of securities used by Fama and French to form
the 25 portfolios used in the previous methodology. The monthly adjusted prices, as
measured by the last day of the month, for each of these securities is pulled from January
1985 to December 2016. The simple monthly returns for each stock then is calculated.
6.2.2 Creating the 20 Portfolios
Fama and Macbeth created portfolios by ranking individual security’s sensitivity to the
market risk premium. The resulting β̂i value of each security then determined which
portfolio it was placed in. The β̂i is the result of the typical Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), where:
ri,t = αi + βi(Mktt − rf,t) + i,t (14)
In equation (14), ri,t is the return on asset i in time t, (Mktt− rf,t) is the market risk
premium in time period t, and βi is the exposure of the security to this risk.
Likewise, we calculate the exposure of each security every year to geopolitical risk by
simply finding the coefficient from a time-series OLS regression of three years of returns
35CRSP website
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as the regressand and one of the geopolitical risk measures from the same period as the
regressor. This specification is given in equation 15:
ri,t = αi + γiGPt + i,t (15)
Where ri,t is the return of security i in month t and γi is the coefficient describing the
relationship between the returns of security i and the measure of geopolitical risk. The
term GPt is the measure of geopolitical risk and is a stand-in for the four measures of
geopolitical risk (level of GPT and GPA and shocks to GPT and GPA).
Like Fama and MacbBeth, we rank every security into 20 portfolios depending on their
exposure to the given measure of geopolitical risk. This guarantees a wide dispersion in
the marginal exposure of each portfolio to geopolitical risk. In total, we create 4 sets of
20 portfolios. Each set is sorted on one of the four measures of geopolitical risk.
Using a two-parameter model results in an “error-in-variables” problem since we can-
not know the true γi value of every security, and we more directly address this problem
with this methodology. If the errors of the γ̂i’s are substantially less than perfectly corre-
lated, the estimated γ’s of portfolios, γ̂p, can be much more precise estimates of true γ’s
than those of individual securities36. Blume (1970) demonstrates that the γ of a portfolio
is simply equal to the weighted average of the individual security γ’s within the portfolio.
Furthermore, as observed by Fama and MacBeth, this procedure of ranking individual
securities based off their γ̂i’s can result in a regression phenomenon. In a cross-section
of γ̂i’s, large γ̂i will tend to overstate the true value of γi while small γ̂i will tend to be
below the true value of γi. These portfolios that we form on the rankings will cause a
bunching of positive and negative sampling errors in portfolios. Like Fama and MacBeth,
to avoid a regression phenomenon, we use one time period, the Portfolio Formation
Period, of data to estimate the individual security γ̂i values that are used to rank and
form the portfolios. Then, we use a subsequent period, the Initial Estimation Period, to
recalculate the γ̂i for securities in each portfolio. Averaging these recalculated γ̂is within
each portfolio, we arrive at the γ̂p for each portfolio p. Finally, these γ̂ps are used as the
initial independent variables in another subsequent period, the Testing Period, where the
price of each measure of geopolitical risk is measured for that period.
For example, we use the Portfolio Formulation Period of January 1985-December 1987
to estimate and rank the γ̂i’s of every security into the 20 portfolios. Then, these rankings
are maintained in the Initial Estimation Period of January 1988-December 1990, where
the γ̂i’s are recalculated using the return and factor/geopolitical risk data from this Initial
Estimation Period. Then averaging these recalculated γ̂is within each portfolio, we arrive
at the γ̂p for each portfolio.
These γ̂p’s serve as the initial independent variables in equation 16 seen before. Each
36Fama and MacBeth (1973)
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portfolio γ̂p is updated every year of the Testing Period, such that the γ̂p’s in the first year
of the Testing Period 1991-1993 are based off data from January 1988-December 1990; the
γ̂p’s in the second year of the Testing Period are calculated off data from January 1988-
December 1991; and in the third year off data from January 1988-December 1992. In total,
we have 9 periods, each consisting of a unique Portfolio Formation, Initial Estimation,
and Testing Period.37 Fama and MacBeth require that for a security to be included, it
must have available data for the entire Initial Estimation Period and the majority of the
Portfolio Formulation Period, along with being available in the first month of the Testing
Period. We modify this slightly by simply requiring a security that exists in all months of
the first year of the Testing Period to exist in all months of the Portfolio Formulation and
Initial Testing Period to be included. Table 8 lays out the time-periods that each Period
consists of and the corresponding number of securities meeting the data requirement for
that Period. In all periods, we are examining significantly more securities than Fama and
MacBeth did as a result of including all securities in the CRSP universe.
Table 8 Portfolio Periods
Period # 1 2 3 4 5
Portfolio Formulation.............................. 1985-87 1988-90 1991-93 1994-96 1997-99
Initial Estimation Period.............................. 1988-90 1991-1993 1994-96 1997-99 2000-02
Testing Period........................................ 1991-93 1994-96 1997-99 2000-02 2003-05
Securities Available in First Year of Testing 6179 7306 8270 7362 6400
Securities Meeting Data Requirement........ 2835 3362 3010 3307 3565
Period # 6 7 8 9
Portfolio Formulation.............................. 2000-02 2003-05 2006-08 2009-11
Initial Estimation Period.............................. 2003-05 2006-08 2009-11 2012-14
Testing Period........................................ 2006-08 2009-11 2012-14 2015-16
Securities Available in First Year of Testing 6293 6259 6258 6665
Securities Meeting Data Requirement........ 3491 3505 3625 3911
We run the same cross-sectional regression seen before for every month t in the Testing
Period:
rpt = λ0,t + λγ,tγ̂p,t−12 + p,t (16)
where p=1,2,...,20
Note again that the portfolio returns used are based on the set of portfolios sorted
on the same measure of geopolitical risk that appears in the right-hand side of the cross-
sectional regression. γ̂p,t−12 is the average of the γ̂i’s within portfolio p as discussed before.
These values change every year of the Testing Period as the Estimation Period is updated
to incorporate the most recent year of data.
Every month t of the Testing Period then results in a λ̂γ,t. By averaging these across
every month in the Testing Period, we arrive at the average λ̂γ for the Testing Period.
37Note we have one less testing period now than in the previous methodology. This is necessary since
we have a Portfolio Formation, Initial Estimation, and Testing Period. Our data for geopolitical risk
begins in January 1985, so the first Testing Period begins in January 1991.
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We test for significance again using equation 10.
Again, we include the 5-factors alongside the measures of geopolitical risk in the
cross-sectional regression for every month t in the Testing Period:
rp,t = λ0t+λβ,tβ̂p,t−12+λS,t ̂Sp, t− 12+λH,tĤp,t−12+λR,tR̂p,t−12+λC,tĈp,t−12+λγ,tγ̂p,t−12+p,t
(17)
where p=1,2,...,20
Akin to the calculation of the γ̂p’s discussed above, we also calculate the average
portfolio coefficient for each factor in the 5-factor model during the Initial Estimation
Period.38 These are then tested alongside γ̂p’s as explanatory variables to determine if
measures of geopolitical risk are priced when controlling for the price of the 5-factors.
Finally, we modify equations 16 and 17 to include both the level of geopolitical risk
and shocks to geopolitical risk in the same cross-sectional regression, as seen in footnote
6.1.1.
Again, we correct the standard errors for time-series correlation. The resulting cor-
rected t-statistics are displayed in italics next to the t-statistics resulting from the Fama-
MacBeth methodology.
6.2.3 Results
As before, we summarize the results regarding GPT in table 9. In the Appendix, table
18 provides the full results for each Testing Period.
In Panel of A,39 the price of the level of GPT is slightly positive and insignificant
over the entire period. In Panel B, shocks to GPT are likewise slightly positive and
insignificant over the entire period. In Panel C, when the price of the level and shocks to
GPT are estimated in the same regression, the price of the level of GPT is positive and
insignificant. Meanwhile, the price of shocks to GPT is negative and insignificant.
In Panels D-F, the prices of the 5-factors are controlled for. In Panel D, the price of
the level of GPT is slightly negative and insignificant. In Panel E, the price of shocks to
GPT is slightly positive and insignificant. In Panel F, the price of the level of GPT is
positive and insignificant while that of shocks to GPT is negative and insignificant.
38These are not displayed, but are available upon request.
39Again, more detailed descriptions of each Panel are contained in the title of the table.
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Table 9 Entire Period Average λ̂γ Values and Significance for GPT, Portfolios Formed
on Exposure to Level or Shocks to GPT: Panel A displays the average λ̂γ values when only the level
of GPT is included in the regression. Panel B displays the average λ̂γ values when only the shocks to GPT is included
in the regression. Panel C displays the average λ̂γ values when the level and shocks to GPT are included in the same
regression. Panels D, E, and F correspond to Panels A, B, and C except that the estimated coefficients of the 5-Factors are
included in the cross-sectional regressions alongside the measures of geopolitical threats. In all cases, the portfolios used in
the cross-sectional regression are formed based on the measure of geopolitical risk used as the independent variable. For
example, the portfolio returns used in Panel A are based off portfolios sorted according securities’ exposures to the level of
GPT.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
̂λγlevel t(̂λγlevel ) t(̂λγlevel ) ̂λγshock t( ̂λγshock ) t( ̂λγshock ) ̂λγlevel ̂λγshock t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock ) t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock )
5.9 0.53 0.48 6.2 0.96 0.95 10.8 -2.4 1.55 -0.35 1.40 -0.30
Panel D Panel E Panel F
̂λγlevel t(̂λγlevel ) t(̂λγlevel ) ̂λγshock t( ̂λγshock ) t( ̂λγshock ) ̂λγlevel ̂λγshock t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock ) t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock )
-1.8 -0.17 -0.17 4.9 0.91 0.79 10.8 -5.5 1.52 -0.59 1.42 -0.54
Table 10 displays the results with regard to GPA. Again, the full results can be found
in the Appendix table 19
In Panel A, the price of the level of GPA is negative and insignificant. Similarly, in
Panel B the price of shocks to GPA are negative and insignificant. In Panel C, when the
price of the level of GPA and shocks to GPA are estimated in the same regression, the
price of the level of GPA is positive and insignificant and the price of shocks to GPA is
negative and insignificant.
In Panels D-F, again the prices of the 5-factors are controlled for. In Panel D, the
price of the level of GPA is negative and insignificant. In Panel E, the price of shocks to
GPA is negative and significant, with a t-statistic of -2.25 (-2.11 corrected). Finally, in
Panel F the price of the level of GPA is negative and significant with a t-statistic of -2.54
(corrected -2.58). The price of shocks to GPA is positive and insignificant.
Table 10 Entire Period Average λ̂γ Values and Significance for GPA, Portfolios Formed
on Exposure to Level or Shocks to GPA: Panel A displays the average λ̂γ values when only the level
of GPA is included in the regression. Panel B displays the average λ̂γ values when only the shocks to GPA is included
in the regression. Panel C displays the average λ̂γ values when the level and shocks to GPA are included in the same
regression. Panels D, E, and F correspond to Panels A, B, and C except that the estimated coefficients of the 5-Factors are
included in the cross-sectional regressions alongside the measures of geopolitical actions. In all cases, the portfolios used in
the cross-sectional regression are formed based on the measure of geopolitical risk used as the independent variable. For
example, the portfolio returns used in Panel A are based off portfolios sorted according securities’ exposures to the level of
GPA.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
̂λγlevel t(̂λγlevel ) t(̂λγlevel ) ̂λγshock t( ̂λγshock ) t( ̂λγshock ) ̂λγlevel ̂λγshock t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock ) t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock )
-4.1 -0.42 -0.45 -12.2 -1.44 -1.34 7.4 -3.7 1.25 -0.75 1.23 -0.72
Panel D Panel E Panel F
̂λγlevel t(̂λγlevel ) t(̂λγlevel ) ̂λγshock t( ̂λγshock ) t( ̂λγshock ) ̂λγlevel ̂λγshock t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock ) t(̂λγlevel ) t( ̂λγshock )
-5.4 -0.72 -0.69 -15.1 -2.25 -2.11 -13.9 9.1 -2.54 1.60 -2.58 1.57
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6.2.4 Discussion and Comparison of Results from both Methodologies
The main goal of this second methodology is to confirm the results seen in the first
methodology and to ensure that there was a significant dispersion in the marginal ex-
posure of each portfolio to the given measure of geopolitical risk. We don’t reinterpret
these results outside of discussing if they are generally in agreement with our original
methodology.
Complete agreement between the results from the original second-pass on the 25 Fama-
French portfolios and the second-pass on our own portfolio sorts is not expected. As Chen
et al. documented, different portfolio sorts tend to render significant results insignificant.
They had to try several different portfolio sorts before settling on one that provided them
with significant results in the cross-sectional regressions. We are mainly looking to see if
the prices of geopolitical risk from this version of sorts refute our findings from before.
By and large, the results are in agreement. Namely, we find again that the level of GPA
is negatively and significantly priced. Furthermore, in the first methodology shocks to
GPA were negatively priced in most periods and often neared significance over the entire
period, though never becoming significant. In the second methodology, shocks to GPA is
likewise negatively priced and broaches significance in one version of the cross-sectional
regression.
In both methodologies, the price of the level and shocks to GPT doesn’t ever broach
significance over the entire period across any of the cross-sectional regressions. Corre-
spondingly, looking at the Appendix tables 16 and 18, the price of the level and shocks
to GPT tended to be more split between positive and negative values. While price of
the level of GPT was largely negative and insignificant in the first methodology, it was
mostly positive and insignificant in the second methodology.
These results largely confirm what we saw in the first methodology, and we maintain
our conclusion that investors should care about their exposure to risks stemming from the
level of geopolitical actions. In both methodologies, we have demonstrated that the level
of geopolitical action has a statistically significant price when controlling for some of the
most important asset-pricing factors, indicating that portfolios with varying exposures to
this risk will have different expected returns.
6.2.5 A Final Observation
We noticed that the pricing of geopolitical risk is not very consistent from one Testing
Period to another. For example, in the first methodology, the level of GPT is significantly
and negatively priced in two of the Testing Periods. However, the level of GPT is often
also positively priced, though not significantly. This is partly due to random variations
in the samples, but we wonder if there are specific characteristics of a Testing Period
that change the price of geopolitical risk. For example, we can casually observe that
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in both methodologies most measures of geopolitical risk are significantly priced in the
2003-2005 Testing Period. Coincidentally, this also marks the beginning of the second
Iraq war. Could this be responsible for the increased price and significance of geopolitical
risk during this time period? It certainly seems plausible to us. While for this study
we largely focused on if geopolitical risk was priced over the entire period, it’s clear
that the pricing of geopolitical risk moves from period to period. This might be to
blame for the price of the level and shocks to GPT being near or at significance in
many individual periods, but never broaching significance over the entire period. If the
relationship between geopolitical risk and returns is changing over time, then it would
be more difficult to find a statistically significant relationship without accounting for this
change. Future studies should more rigorously focus on asking if different periods are
characterized by different premiums on geopolitical risk.
7 Conclusion and Areas for Further Study
We first examined the geopolitical risk indexes created by Caldara and Iacoveillo within
the context of the Fama and French 5-factor model to determine if this risk is unique in
explaining returns from known proxies of risk. A key distinction was made between the
level of geopolitical risk and shocks to geopolitical risk. We found that levels and shocks
to geopolitical risk lose most of their significance in explaining returns when controlling
for the 5-factors. Furthermore, we found it can be important to disentangle the effects
of the level of geopolitical risk and shocks to geopolitical risk. The level of geopolitical
actions becomes statistically significant in explaining returns when shocks to geopolitical
actions are controlled for.
We found the level of GPA is significantly and negatively priced even when controlling
for the 5-factors, indicating that securities with a negative exposure to the level of GPA
have higher expected returns. Likewise, the price shocks to GPA often verged on negative
significance across entire periods and broached significance in the second methodology.
We did not develop a theory for understanding the negative sign on the risk premium of
the level of GPA. Further areas of study will likely consist of exploring why the exposure
to measures of geopolitical action tends to affect future performance. We posited that
perhaps increased levels of GPA leads to more future shocks to GPT, which depress
returns. Or maybe investors find securities with a negative exposure to the level of
GPA to be inherently more valuable since decreases in action might actually increase
uncertainty and negatively exposed portfolios hedge against this possibility. In any case,
there is strong reason to believe that exposure to the level of geopolitical action impacts
expected returns.
Finally, we observed that often geopolitical risk was significantly priced in certain
Testing Periods and not others. This pricing also tended to vary across periods between
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positive and negative values. We relied on the pricing of the entire period since the
variations of pricing with lower sample sizes was high, but we wonder if there are specific
characteristics of certain periods that change the price of geopolitical risk.
Future studies should first focus on developing a better model to estimate shocks to
geopolitical risk. We used the AR(1) model proposed by Calara et al. and defended
that it was somewhat representative of reality, but it’s difficult to know how accurate
our distinction between levels and shocks is without the assistance of a better model.
Furthermore, future studies should examine if specific traits of portfolios make them more
or less exposed to geopolitical risk. It makes sense to us, for example, that securities with
a larger market capitalization might be more affected by geopolitical risk since they tend
to have more international operations. Lastly, while we have demonstrated that the level
of geopolitical actions is significantly priced over the entire period, there is still much to
be done to understand if the price of geopolitical risk is dependent on the characteristics
of the specific periods.
8 Appendix
Table 11 Characteristics of the 25 Fama-French Portfolios. ME indicates Size and BM indicates
Book-Market value. The number 1 indicates the securities with the lowest value of the given characteristic are in that
portfolio. For example, portfolio 25 contains securities with the intersection of the smallest Sizes and smallest Book-Market
values. Portfolio 1 contains securities with the intersection of the largest Sizes and largest Book-Market values
Portfolio Number Characteristics
25 ME1 BM1
24 ME1 BM2
23 ME1 BM3
22 ME1 BM4
21 ME1 BM5
20 ME2 BM1
19 ME2 BM2
18 ME2 BM3
17 ME2 BM4
16 ME2 BM5
15 ME3 BM1
14 ME3 BM2
13 ME3 BM3
12 ME3 BM4
11 ME3 BM5
10 ME4 BM1
9 ME4 BM2
8 ME4 BM3
7 ME4 BM4
6 ME4 BM5
5 ME5 BM1
4 ME5 BM2
3 ME5 BM3
2 ME5 BM4
1 ME5 MB5
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Table 12 Regressions on Levels and Shocks to GPT and GPA
25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13
GPT Only
γ̂level -0.0021 -0.0035 -0.0032 -0.0027 -0.0033 0.0031 -0.0026 -0.0016 -0.0032 -0.0070 0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0039
t(γ̂level) -0.30 -0.63 -0.65 -0.69 -0.75 0.44 -0.52 -0.37 -0.73 -1.40 1.36 -0.42 -0.86
GPT+Factors
γ̂level -0.0022 -0.0024 -0.0011 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0025 -0.0010 0.0016 0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0002
t(γ̂level) -0.76 -1.20 -0.55 -0.13 0.05 1.09 -0.71 1.33 0.95 -0.96 -0.23 0.33 -0.13
GPA Only
γ̂level 0.0099 0.0065 0.0064 0.0052 0.0055 0.0107 0.0061 0.0047 0.0043 0.0043 0.0084 0.0053 0.0040
t(γ̂level) 1.41 1.14 1.31 1.29 1.17 1.49 1.08 0.98 0.88 0.69 0.33 1.04 0.81
GPA+Factors
γ̂level 0.0022 0.0003 0.0019 0.0014 0.0022 0.0026 0.0006 0.0011 0.0017 0.0018 0.0012 0.0014 0.0016
t(γ̂level) 0.84 0.19 1.19 0.94 1.14 1.59 0.41 0.87 1.38 1.10 0.66 0.96 0.85
GPTSHOCK Only
̂γshock -0.0213 -0.0167 -0.0165 -0.0122 -0.0132 -0.0119 -0.0143 -0.0109 -0.0142 -0.0178 -0.0124 -0.0121 -0.0145
t(̂γshock) -2.10 -1.84 -2.14 -1.83 -1.68 -1.05 -1.63 -1.38 -1.78 -1.90 2.41 -1.40 -1.85
GPTSHOCK+Factors
̂γshock -0.0073 -0.0039 -0.0045 -0.0012 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0027 0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0004 -0.0022
t(̂γshock) -1.85 -1.52 -1.52 -0.46 -0.04 0.04 -1.61 0.58 -0.73 -0.83 -0.96 -0.20 -1.09
GPASHOCK Only
̂γshock -0.0015 -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0014 -0.0018 0.0011 -0.0019 -0.0025 -0.0036 -0.0044 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0029
t(̂γshock) -0.18 -0.33 -0.36 -0.27 -0.30 0.12 -0.28 -0.44 -0.59 -0.63 2.42 -0.08 -0.48
GPASHOCK+Factors
̂γshock 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0011 0.0018 0.0016 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0008 0.0005 0.0021 0.0008
t(̂γshock) 0.11 -0.19 0.20 0.71 0.83 1.09 -0.16 0.18 0.14 0.48 0.34 1.27 0.40
Table 13 Regressions on Levels and Shocks to GPT and GPA cont’d
12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
GPT Only
γ̂level -0.0040 -0.0068 -0.0007 -0.0038 -0.0021 -0.0047 -0.0115 -0.0013 -0.0043 -0.0041 -0.0037 -0.0110
t(γ̂level) -0.93 -1.31 -0.13 -0.88 -0.48 -1.12 -1.89 -0.29 -1.05 -1.30 -0.89 -2.79
GPT+ Factors
γ̂level 0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0026 0.0004 -0.0048 0.0000 -0.0007 0.0007 0.0024 -0.0043
t(γ̂level) 0.50 -0.31 -0.25 -0.05 1.46 0.25 -1.56 -0.02 -0.64 0.59 1.43 -2.58
GPA Only
γ̂level 0.0047 0.0030 0.0063 0.0032 0.0039 0.0021 -0.0018 0.0029 0.0017 -0.0006 0.0015 -0.0052
t(γ̂level) 0.95 0.49 1.02 0.69 0.88 0.44 -0.27 0.63 0.41 -0.16 0.38 -1.13
GPA+Factors
γ̂level 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.004
t(γ̂level) 1.81 0.49 0.56 0.72 1.97 0.85 -0.60 -0.01 0.37 -0.30 1.84 -2.76
GPTSHOCK Only
̂γshock -0.0159 -0.0181 -0.0127 -0.0153 -0.0121 -0.0161 -0.0274 -0.0114 -0.0138 -0.0101 -0.0138 -0.0184
t(̂γshock) -2.08 -2.03 -1.39 -2.05 -1.56 -2.24 -2.67 -1.58 -2.00 -1.86 -2.16 -2.95
GPTSHOCK+Factors
̂γshock -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0010 -0.0024 0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0100 -0.0001 -0.0016 0.0030 0.0009 -0.0023
t(̂γshock) -1.08 -0.77 -0.40 -1.02 0.69 -0.70 -2.12 -0.06 -0.85 1.64 0.39 -1.00
GPASHOCK Only
̂γshock -0.0025 -0.0057 -0.0013 -0.0044 -0.0032 -0.0047 -0.0099 -0.0045 -0.0048 -0.0059 -0.0037 -0.0103
t(̂γshock) -0.43 -0.81 -0.18 -0.77 -0.61 -0.88 -1.43 -0.81 -0.98 -1.51 -0.84 -2.35
GPASHOCK+Factors
̂γshock 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.003
t(̂γshock) 1.01 -0.04 0.27 -0.18 1.00 0.38 -0.89 -1.19 -0.44 -0.53 1.65 -1.95
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Table 14 Regressions on Levels and Shocks to GPT and GPA Included in Same Regres-
sion
25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13
GPT + GPTSHOCK Only
γ̂level 0.0095 0.0049 0.0052 0.0034 0.0032 0.0109 0.0046 0.0041 0.0039 0.0010 0.0077 0.0042 0.0031
̂γshock -0.0213 -0.0167 -0.0165 -0.0122 -0.0132 -0.0118 -0.0142 -0.0109 -0.0142 -0.0178 -0.0124 -0.0121 -0.0145
t(γ̂level) 1.54 0.97 1.14 0.93 0.82 1.82 1.01 1.03 1.05 0.20 0.36 1.05 0.80
t(̂γshock) -2.27 -1.92 -2.25 -1.90 -1.73 -1.10 -1.69 -1.43 -1.84 -1.92 -1.31 -1.45 -1.89
GPT+GPTSHOCK+Factors
γ̂level 0.0012 -0.0010 0.0011 0.0004 0.0002 0.0032 0.0002 0.0016 0.0021 -0.0005 0.0006 0.0009 0.0009
̂γshock -0.0073 -0.0039 -0.0045 -0.0012 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0027 0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0004 -0.0022
t(γ̂level) 0.44 -0.54 0.54 0.27 0.11 1.54 0.12 1.21 2.39 -0.34 0.36 0.59 0.58
t(̂γshock) -1.86 -1.48 -1.53 -0.45 -0.04 0.03 -1.61 0.62 -0.73 -0.83 -0.95 -0.21 -1.10
GPA + GPASHOCK Only
γ̂level 0.0351 0.0262 0.0254 0.0197 0.0216 0.0321 0.0239 0.0207 0.0218 0.0233 0.0267 0.0183 0.0192
̂γshock -0.0016 -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0014 -0.0019 0.0010 -0.0020 -0.0026 -0.0036 -0.0044 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0029
t(γ̂level) 2.84 3.02 3.27 3.42 3.16 3.31 3.19 3.46 3.52 2.80 -1.59 2.95 3.49
t(̂γshock) -0.22 -0.37 -0.40 -0.30 -0.32 0.13 -0.31 -0.48 -0.63 -0.67 0.02 -0.09 -0.53
GPA+GPASHOCK+Factors
γ̂level 0.0064 0.0020 0.0053 0.0021 0.0032 0.0049 0.0024 0.0030 0.0051 0.0039 0.0026 -0.0001 0.0034
̂γshock 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0011 0.0018 0.0016 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0008 0.0005 0.0021 0.0008
t(γ̂level) 1.07 0.58 1.57 0.77 0.89 1.55 0.87 1.38 2.42 1.32 0.83 -0.03 1.20
t(̂γshock) 0.11 -0.18 0.20 0.73 0.82 1.14 -0.16 0.18 0.14 0.47 0.35 1.27 0.41
Table 15 Regressions on Levels and Shocks to GPT and GPA Included in Same Regres-
sion cont’d
12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
GPT + GPTSHOCK Only
γ̂level 0.0038 0.0013 0.0063 0.0036 0.0041 0.0030 0.0005 0.0049 0.0022 0.0003 0.0031 -0.0039
̂γshock -0.0159 -0.0181 -0.0126 -0.0153 -0.0121 -0.0161 -0.0274 -0.0114 -0.0138 -0.0102 -0.0138 -0.0184
t(γ̂level) 0.91 0.28 1.35 1.01 1.07 0.86 0.10 1.42 0.72 0.12 0.96 -0.98
t(̂γshock) -2.17 -2.05 -1.45 -2.13 -1.62 -2.31 -2.68 -1.65 -2.04 -1.87 -2.20 -2.86
GPT+GPTSHOCK+Factors
γ̂level 0.0026 0.0004 0.0000 0.0012 0.0024 0.0015 -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0008 0.0027 -0.0044
̂γshock -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0010 -0.0024 0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0100 -0.0001 -0.0016 0.0030 0.0009 -0.0023
t(γ̂level) 1.55 0.16 -0.02 0.85 1.45 1.20 -0.22 0.03 -0.06 -0.75 2.00 -2.79
t(̂γshock) -1.15 -0.78 -0.40 -1.03 0.73 -0.71 -2.11 -0.06 -0.84 1.68 0.37 -1.11
GPA + GPASHOCK Only
γ̂level 0.0207 0.0221 0.0233 0.0201 0.0195 0.0169 0.0159 0.0192 0.0160 0.0113 0.0130 0.0057
̂γshock -0.0026 -0.0057 -0.0014 -0.0044 -0.0032 -0.0047 -0.0100 -0.0045 -0.0048 -0.0060 -0.0037 -0.0103
t(γ̂level) 3.41 2.81 3.13 3.40 3.54 2.95 1.85 3.59 3.26 2.45 2.45 0.76
t(̂γshock) -0.48 -0.88 -0.20 -0.84 -0.66 -0.94 -1.49 -0.89 -1.05 -1.57 -0.88 -2.38
GPA+GPASHOCK+Factors
γ̂level 0.0061 0.0056 0.0023 0.0051 0.0050 0.0035 0.0002 0.0034 0.0031 0.0005 0.0025 -0.0064
̂γshock 0.0020 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0016 0.0008 -0.0026 -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0029 -0.0030
t(γ̂level) 2.41 1.08 0.76 1.55 2.05 1.28 0.05 1.89 1.50 0.20 1.01 -1.98
t(̂γshock) 1.09 -0.06 0.27 -0.18 1.00 0.39 -0.89 -1.27 -0.45 -0.52 1.67 -1.92
35
Table 16 Testing Period Average λ̂γ Values and Significance for GPT: Panel A displays the
average λ̂γ values when only the level of GPT is included in the regression. Panel B displays the average λ̂γ values when
only the shocks to GPT is included in the regression. Panel C displays the average λ̂γ values when the level and shocks to
GPT are included in the same regression. Panels D, E, and F correspond to Panels A, B, and C except that the estimated
coefficients of the 5-Factors are included in the cross sectional regressions alongside the measures of geopolitical threats
1988-90 1991-93 1994-96 1997-99 2000-02 2003-05 2006-08 2009-11 2012-14 2015-16 Entire Period
Panel A
̂λγlevel -5.1 -63.7 -4.7 4.1 -24.2 -17.5 -10.3 16.5 -3.5 -16.6 -12.4
t(̂λγlevel ) -0.69 -2.12 -0.25 0.43 -0.99 -0.88 -0.26 1.25 -0.36 -0.45 -1.75
t(̂λγlevel ) -0.47 -1.83 -0.18 0.46 -0.79 -0.72 -0.24 1.00 -0.54 -0.53 -1.54
Panel B
̂λγshock -2.2 -45.8 14.4 -3.2 15.4 -15.4 8.3 12.4 -3.3 -29.8 -4.1
t( ̂λγshock ) -0.29 -1.74 1.24 -0.20 0.35 -1.03 0.52 1.02 -0.38 -1.31 -0.56
t( ̂λγshock ) -0.21 -1.75 1.52 -0.25 0.34 -1.02 0.60 0.95 -0.54 -1.41 -0.62
Panel C
̂λγlevel -67.4 11.6 -5.3 -1.4 -5.8 -14.1 -2.1 4.8 -1.4 -15.4 -9.43
̂λγshock 5.5 -33.6 13.0 -4.3 13.8 -17.1 8.2 11.6 -3.8 -18.0 -1.93
t(̂λγlevel ) -1.33 0.63 -0.22 -0.06 -0.20 -0.66 -0.07 0.27 -0.21 -0.56 -1.11
t( ̂λγshock ) 0.68 -1.80 1.16 -0.28 0.34 -1.13 0.46 1.09 -0.44 -0.59 -0.32
t(̂λγlevel ) -1.04 0.63 -0.16 -0.05 -0.20 -0.59 -0.06 0.25 -0.23 -0.67 -0.96
t( ̂λγshock ) 0.58 -1.62 1.40 -0.35 0.30 -1.07 0.51 1.03 -0.51 -0.70 -0.30
Panel D
̂λγlevel -17.4 -4.8 2.8 -3.2 9.1 -38.4 9.8 13.9 -5.9 2.9 -3.3
t(̂λγlevel ) -2.76 -0.46 0.43 -0.37 0.39 -1.34 0.25 1.51 -1.10 0.12 -0.55
t(̂λγlevel ) -3.59 -0.46 0.36 -0.38 0.37 -1.05 0.37 1.17 -1.23 0.15 -0.60
Panel E
̂λγshock -17.9 -2.7 22.4 7.1 15.7 -17.6 21.7 15.5 -6.9 -14.8 2.8
t( ̂λγshock ) -2.65 -0.33 3.82 0.95 0.63 -0.75 1.59 1.27 -1.25 -0.96 0.57
t( ̂λγshock ) -2.82 -0.28 3.48 1.18 0.74 -0.49 2.05 1.05 -1.58 -0.81 0.59
Panel F
̂λγlevel -86.5 4.5 -3.8 -5.7 43.5 -60.8 -23.5 11.3 -6.2 -3.1 -13.38
̂λγshock -19.6 -3.4 22.8 5.4 15.2 -13.8 19.3 15.6 -7.9 -12.8 2.58
t(̂λγlevel ) -2.26 0.33 -0.31 -0.46 1.50 -2.62 -0.84 0.66 -1.03 -0.18 -1.90
t( ̂λγshock ) -2.88 -0.42 4.02 0.65 0.63 -0.60 1.36 1.35 -1.41 -0.65 0.58
t(̂λγlevel ) -1.80 0.34 -0.26 -0.53 1.52 -2.27 -1.04 0.66 -1.02 -0.23 -1.68
t( ̂λγshock ) -2.81 -0.33 3.41 0.76 0.71 -0.38 1.92 1.07 -1.83 -0.58 0.54
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Table 17 Testing Period Average λ̂γ Values and Significance for GPA: Panel A displays the
average λ̂γ values when only the level of GPA is included in the regression. Panel B displays the average λ̂γ values when
only the shocks to GPA is included in the regression. Panel C displays the average λ̂γ values when the level and shocks to
GPA are included in the same regression. Panels D, E, and F correspond to Panels A, B, and C except that the estimated
coefficients of the 5-Factors are included in the cross sectional regressions alongside the measures of geopolitical action
1988-90 1991-93 1994-96 1997-99 2000-02 2003-05 2006-08 2009-11 2012-14 2015-16 Entire Period
Panel A
̂λγlevel -43.9 34.8 -8.9 -8.2 -21.4 -7.3 -5.4 -7.7 0.0 -12.7 -7.9
t(̂λγlevel ) -0.95 1.43 -0.37 -0.34 -0.74 -0.34 -0.21 -0.40 0.00 -0.49 -0.97
t(̂λγlevel ) -0.70 1.46 -0.27 -0.30 -0.78 -0.28 -0.19 -0.37 0.01 -0.54 -0.83
Panel B
̂λγshock -55.5 28.4 -6.2 -39.4 11.8 -18.8 45.5 -15.7 -1.1 -3.2 -5.5
t( ̂λγshock ) -1.09 1.19 -0.25 -1.22 0.39 -1.06 1.68 -1.00 -0.19 -0.20 -0.57
t( ̂λγshock ) -0.74 1.22 -0.18 -0.93 0.44 -0.99 1.57 -1.10 -0.23 -0.24 -0.51
Panel C
̂λγlevel -41.3 17.4 -4.3 -32.6 29.0 -19.6 25.0 -12.2 2.1 -17.8 -5.0
̂λγshock -79.4 -6.9 5.4 -39.7 46.6 -25.2 34.1 -15.8 -0.6 -15.7 -9.5
t(̂λγlevel ) -1.00 0.97 -0.19 -1.34 0.99 -0.92 0.83 -0.64 0.26 -0.72 -0.64
t( ̂λγshock ) -1.47 -0.46 0.32 -1.47 1.52 -1.34 1.26 -1.01 -0.10 -0.75 -1.13
t(̂λγlevel ) -0.70 0.99 -0.14 -1.28 1.11 -0.84 0.76 -0.63 0.41 -0.81 -0.55
t( ̂λγshock ) -1.00 -0.38 0.31 -1.29 1.60 -1.33 1.15 -1.15 -0.12 -0.74 -0.91
Panel D
̂λγlevel -110.4 5.4 -7.8 -6.1 44.2 -52.5 -29.8 11.2 -5.1 -5.0 -16.0
t(̂λγlevel ) -2.72 0.42 -0.64 -0.51 1.54 -2.13 -1.11 0.71 -0.89 -0.32 -2.23
t(̂λγlevel ) -2.85 0.41 -0.55 -0.62 1.53 -1.87 -1.20 0.72 -0.82 -0.40 -2.07
Panel E
̂λγshock -67.9 0.1 2.8 -0.4 37.0 -48.3 -5.9 20.0 -5.6 -5.5 -7.5
t( ̂λγshock ) -2.06 0.01 0.26 -0.03 1.52 -2.13 -0.29 1.12 -1.29 -0.52 -1.10
t( ̂λγshock ) -1.83 0.01 0.24 -0.03 1.68 -1.48 -0.41 1.13 -1.17 -0.69 -1.13
Panel F
̂λγlevel -102.9 8.4 -6.0 -2.9 42.1 -73.5 -34.6 12.0 -2.9 -2.7 -16.8
̂λγshock -75.0 -1.8 8.0 -1.3 39.3 -43.5 -13.4 21.1 -4.9 -4.1 -7.7
t(̂λγlevel ) -3.15 0.67 -0.48 -0.23 1.44 -3.02 -1.28 0.73 -0.47 -0.18 -2.46
t( ̂λγshock ) -2.42 -0.17 0.77 -0.10 1.63 -1.77 -0.59 1.31 -1.04 -0.37 -1.27
t(̂λγlevel ) -3.19 0.66 -0.43 -0.27 1.43 -2.31 -1.34 0.77 -0.48 -0.21 -2.18
t( ̂λγshock ) -2.19 -0.19 0.78 -0.10 1.80 -1.19 -0.72 1.26 -0.94 -0.39 -1.13
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Table 18 Testing Period Average λ̂γ Values and Significance for GPT, Portfolios Formed
on Exposure to Level or Shocks to GPT: Panel A displays the average λ̂γ values when only the level
of GPT is included in the regression. Panel B displays the average λ̂γ values when only the shocks to GPT is included
in the regression. Panel C displays the average λ̂γ values when the level and shocks to GPT are included in the same
regression. Panels D, E, and F correspond to Panels A, B, and C except that the estimated coefficients of the 5-Factors are
included in the cross-sectional regressions alongside the measures of geopolitical threats. In all cases, the portfolios used in
the cross-sectional regression are formed based on the measure of geopolitical risk used as the independent variable. For
example, the portfolio returns used in Panel A are based off portfolios sorted according securities’ exposures to the level of
GPT.
1991-93 1994-96 1997-99 2000-02 2003-05 2006-08 2009-11 2012-14 2015-16 Entire Period
Panel A
̂λγlevel -11.4 -2.3 -9.0 -31.4 157.9 12.4 -35.3 -10.9 -27.8 5.9
t(̂λγlevel ) -0.54 -0.31 -1.29 -0.58 2.48 0.43 -2.15 -1.49 -0.89 0.53
t(̂λγlevel ) -0.46 -0.25 -1.45 -0.54 1.96 0.41 -2.09 -1.16 -0.85 0.48
Panel B
̂λγshock 24.8 -4.7 -4.8 2.1 -3.7 -19.9 -8.1 -2.4 105.1 6.2
t( ̂λγshock ) 1.54 -0.66 -0.87 0.10 -0.38 -1.38 -0.97 -0.29 1.99 0.96
t( ̂λγshock ) 1.41 -0.60 -0.77 0.07 -0.26 -1.13 -0.90 -0.24 2.51 0.95
Panel C
̂λγlevel 53.1 3.4 -5.3 -15.9 67.3 -2.9 -6.9 -6.4 10.7 10.8
̂λγshock -21.7 16.3 -3.9 1.5 40.9 20.0 -18.6 1.0 -85.2 -2.4
t(̂λγlevel ) 1.60 0.46 -1.20 -0.59 1.90 -0.14 -1.08 -1.53 0.95 1.55
t( ̂λγshock ) -1.35 1.13 -0.48 0.06 1.86 0.79 -1.85 0.13 -1.80 -0.35
t(̂λγlevel ) 1.32 0.39 -0.87 -0.62 1.73 -0.12 -0.95 -1.61 0.81 1.40
t( ̂λγshock ) -1.38 0.83 -0.41 0.04 1.91 0.67 -1.91 0.10 -1.57 -0.30
Panel D
̂λγlevel 21.0 10.2 -7.3 -43.4 92.2 -10.5 -11.7 -14.9 -77.3 -1.8
t(̂λγlevel ) 1.01 2.24 -1.26 -0.98 2.13 -0.34 -0.88 -1.50 -0.94 -0.17
t(̂λγlevel ) 0.86 1.96 -1.47 -1.00 2.18 -0.25 -0.88 -1.56 -0.90 -0.17
Panel E
̂λγshock 0.6 -6.0 2.0 -1.8 61.1 -11.4 -5.8 8.9 -7.6 4.9
t( ̂λγshock ) 0.03 -0.57 0.50 -0.09 2.71 -0.56 -0.65 1.42 -0.34 0.91
t( ̂λγshock ) 0.03 -0.60 0.37 -0.11 1.44 -0.70 -0.84 1.30 -0.32 0.79
Panel F
̂λγlevel 77.6 11.0 -3.6 -5.9 16.8 -6.0 9.8 -1.3 -7.0 10.8
̂λγshock -33.5 19.1 -3.5 -37.9 99.7 -6.7 -21.9 -12.3 -76.5 -5.5
t(̂λγlevel ) 2.42 2.39 -0.75 -0.28 0.42 -0.36 1.47 -0.33 -0.22 1.52
t( ̂λγshock ) -1.57 1.69 -0.48 -1.15 2.88 -0.16 -1.67 -1.62 -1.28 -0.59
t(̂λγlevel ) 1.90 2.15 -0.57 -0.28 0.47 -0.31 1.41 -0.31 -0.18 1.42
t( ̂λγshock ) -1.33 1.31 -0.41 -1.27 2.57 -0.15 -1.55 -1.63 -1.23 -0.54
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Table 19 Testing Period Average λ̂γ Values and Significance for GPA, Portfolios Formed
on Exposure to Level or Shocks to GPA: Panel A displays the average λ̂γ values when only the level
of GPA is included in the regression. Panel B displays the average λ̂γ values when only the shocks to GPA is included
in the regression. Panel C displays the average λ̂γ values when the level and shocks to GPA are included in the same
regression. Panels D, E, and F correspond to Panels A, B, and C except that the estimated coefficients of the 5-Factors are
included in the cross-sectional regressions alongside the measures of geopolitical actions. In all cases, the portfolios used in
the cross-sectional regression are formed based on the measure of geopolitical risk used as the independent variable. For
example, the portfolio returns used in Panel A are based off portfolios sorted according securities’ exposures to the level of
GPA.
1991-93 1994-96 1997-99 2000-02 2003-05 2006-08 2009-11 2012-14 2015-16 Entire Period
Panel A
̂λγlevel 37.2 -4.2 2.2 -50.9 75.9 -16.4 -42.0 2.1 -58.9 -4.1
t(̂λγlevel ) 1.35 -0.36 0.17 -0.92 1.94 -0.54 -2.99 0.41 -1.76 -0.42
t(̂λγlevel ) 1.51 -0.46 0.13 -1.14 1.73 -0.45 -2.89 0.42 -1.90 -0.45
Panel B
̂λγshock -32.9 3.0 -7.2 52.4 -77.0 19.6 -39.7 1.5 -37.8 -12.2
t( ̂λγshock ) -2.61 0.28 -0.66 1.21 -2.15 0.66 -1.75 0.35 -1.53 -1.44
̂λγshock -3.02 0.24 -0.59 1.37 -1.86 0.44 -1.98 0.39 -1.53 -1.34
Panel C
̂λγlevel 53.1 17.8 3.8 -25.0 24.7 -2.6 8.5 -4.4 -18.1 7.4
̂λγshock 29.5 -1.1 3.5 8.3 -28.3 -5.0 -41.6 2.3 0.5 -3.7
t(̂λγlevel ) 1.73 1.15 0.63 -1.05 1.22 -0.23 0.56 -0.69 -1.58 1.25
t( ̂λγshock ) 1.77 -0.13 0.47 0.91 -1.16 -0.32 -2.74 0.33 0.02 -0.75
t(̂λγlevel ) 1.75 1.30 0.62 -1.27 1.11 -0.18 0.42 -0.72 -1.38 1.23
t( ̂λγshock ) 1.90 -0.15 0.40 1.19 -1.00 -0.32 -2.85 0.40 0.02 -0.72
Panel D
̂λγlevel 23.6 -2.9 26.0 -15.8 -101.3 28.3 -9.7 -0.1 7.6 -5.4
t(̂λγlevel ) 1.38 -0.17 2.00 -0.56 -2.45 1.35 -0.78 -0.01 0.30 -0.72
t(̂λγlevel ) 1.47 -0.22 1.82 -0.91 -1.99 1.07 -0.66 -0.01 0.43 -0.69
Panel E
̂λγshock -58.7 -4.1 -4.8 -32.6 5.3 -2.8 -24.4 -1.3 -11.7 -15.1
t( ̂λγshock ) -2.73 -0.28 -0.37 -1.49 0.22 -0.09 -1.28 -0.44 -0.66 -2.25
t( ̂λγshock ) -3.23 -0.25 -0.28 -1.59 0.25 -0.06 -1.23 -0.39 -0.77 -2.11
Panel F
̂λγlevel 17.5 -10.2 0.6 -5.9 -86.0 -7.6 -15.6 4.6 -26.2 -13.9
̂λγshock 18.1 2.4 26.9 -9.8 -8.8 37.2 1.6 0.4 16.7 9.1
t(̂λγlevel ) 1.25 -0.43 0.13 -0.30 -3.81 -0.48 -1.42 0.71 -1.59 -2.54
t( ̂λγshock ) 1.27 0.23 2.22 -0.65 -0.29 1.55 0.14 0.08 0.70 1.60
t(̂λγlevel ) 1.71 -0.53 0.12 -0.41 -3.63 -0.48 -1.38 0.64 -1.68 -2.58
t( ̂λγshock ) 1.26 0.27 1.80 -1.08 -0.27 1.19 0.14 0.08 0.91 1.57
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